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TOWARDS SHAREHOLDER VOTE ON
EQUITY ISSUANCES
NICCOLÒ CALVI*
New share issuances are capable of severe corporate governance
consequences for the issuer and should be considered fundamental
changes. Several recent Delaware cases confirm the severity of new
share issuances, showing that the transactions have been used to affect
the ownership structure of the firm, with the goal to either dilute or
strengthen the participation of identified shareholders. U.S. law adopts
a management-centric approach to the transaction, which is more
focused on its economic side and seems consistent with the traditional
view of public corporations with dispersed shareholders. However, this
legal framework does not seem responsive to shareholders’ interests
anymore.
The institutionalization of the shareholder base of public firms has
increased the average concentration of the ownership structures and the
shareholders’ powers. This Article identifies several instances of
conflicts between the insiders and the outsiders, where shareholders
carry a strong interest in avoiding the dilution of their voting power.
Moreover, the entire fairness analysis proves to be flawed in that it fails
to consider that the value of voting rights is highly subjective both for
controllers and minority shareholders. Managers may take advantage
of the tool, exploiting either the value or the voting rights of the existing
shareholders. The claim of this Article is to increase the shareholders’
power in U.S. law.
The comparative analysis helps identify possible tools. Namely,
European legal systems set forth both the preemptive right and the
requirement of the existing shareholders’ approval. After having
identified the flaws of the preemptive right provision — mainly due to the
information asymmetry that affects outsider shareholders — this Article
puts up a new framework requiring mandatory approval of new share
issuances. Certain recent Italian cases witnessed a successful opposition
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by the outsider shareholders, who cast a negative vote and prevented the
completion of the transaction. The value of the proposed rule in this
Article declines depending on the presence of a controlling shareholder.
Namely, while in non-controlled firms all the shareholders should be
entitled to cast their vote, in controlled firms, the controller should vote
only if the issuance does not strengthen her position, in order to avoid
tunneling issues.
Authoritative studies debated the increase of shareholders’ powers in
public firms. Other essays focused on the issue of midstream
recapitalizations and the protection of the minority shareholders in
controlled firms. This Article analyzes a wide range of new share
issuances both in controlled and in non-controlled firms, considering the
possible incentives underlying the decision to enter into the transaction.
The impact of the transaction is not trivial since, among other reasons,
any debate on shareholder engagement and activism is frustrated as the
insiders are empowered to easily dilute the “noisy” outsiders at will.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issuance of new shares is an immediate corporate way to raise
additional equity capital. This statement is equally applicable to each case
regardless of a firm’s features such as the country of incorporation, the listing
of its securities, the size and the governance, and transactions’ features such
as the purchasers’ identity and the new share price. However, depending on
the combination of these traits, an equity issuance may cause several
additional effects. Namely, according to this Article, it is a fundamental
change considering its potentially massive impact on the ownership structure
and the governance of the issuer.
In February of 2013, Steel Partners Holdings, L.P. (“Steel Holdings”)
entered into a settlement agreement with the board of directors of
ModusLink Global Solutions (“ModusLink”), after acquiring the public
stocks of ModusLink since 2011, and reaching a stake granting 14.9 percent
of the voting rights.1 Pursuant to the agreement, ModusLink privately issued
shares and warrants to Steel Holdings, which increased its ownership to 29.9
percent and, as of December 2016, owned approximately 35.62 percent of
the outstanding shares.2 In December of 2017, in order to fund an
acquisition, the Special Committee and the Board of ModusLink approved a
capital raise through the issuance of convertible preferred stocks to the
alleged controller.3 The initial conversion price was at a 31.5 percent
premium over the previous day’s closing price of the stock, significantly
increasing Steel Holding’s voting power from 35.62 percent to nearly half
(i.e., 46.76 percent).4 The board further approved the issuance of the equity
grants to three members affiliated with Steel Holdings, which, together with
its affiliates, reached beneficial ownership equal to approximately 52.3

1. Reith v. Lichtenstein, No. 2018-0277-MTZ, 2019 WL 2714065, at *2 (Del. Ch.
June 28, 2019).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *4.
4. Id.
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percent.5 Therefore, over the years, Steel Holdings achieved majority
control of the issuer, taking advantage of both: (i) the 2013 private
placement; and (ii) the 2017 equity financing transaction that was under
review in the dispute.6
In July of 2014, in the context of the purchase of another company —
Lorillard, Inc. (“Lorillard”), exchanged for both stocks and shares —
Reynolds American, Inc. (“Reynolds American”) issued new shares to its
forty-two percent shareholder British American Tobacco PLC (“British
American Tobacco”), preventing the latter from being diluted by the
transaction.7 While the issuance might facially seem to not affect the
governance of the firm — in that the alleged controller does not increase its
ownership stake — this is not the case. In fact, pursuant to the transaction
entered into with Lorillard, the shareholders of the latter would own
approximately fifteen percent of Reynolds American: due to the issuance
(reserved to British American Tobacco), only the public shareholders of
Reynolds American were affected by the entrance of Lorillard’s shareholders
into the ownership structure of the firm. 8 Therefore, the impact on the
issuer’s governance was not trivial.9
In May of 2017, Surgery Partners, Inc., a Delaware corporation with a
concentrated ownership structure (“Surgery Partners”), and its controlling
stockholder, H.I.G. Capital, LLC (“HIG”), entered into a series of
interrelated transactions that provided, among other things, that: (i) HIG
would sell its fifty-four percent common stock stake to an affiliate of Bain
Capital Private Equity, LP (“Bain”); and (ii) Surgery Partners would issue to
Bain newly created convertible preferred stocks in exchange for $310
million.10 These preferred stocks voted with the common stock and provided
for some tailored terms enabling Bain to further lock the control of the issuer.
Namely, holding half of these newly issued preferred stocks (regardless of a
possible dismissal of the common stocks) empowered Bain to prevent
Surgery Partners from entering into a number of corporate governance and
5. Id. at *5.
6. See id. at *1–3 (detailing the background surrounding Steel Holdings’ majority

control status).
7. Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco, PLC, 821 S.E.2d 729, 731 (N.C. 2018). Note that
the ruling of the Supreme Court of North Carolina makes extensive use of Delaware case
law.
8. Id. at 735.
9. See id. at 736 (“BAT’s voting power did not increase, but it was allowed to
remain constant at the sole expense of plaintiff and the other non-BAT stockholders,
whose voting power significantly decreased.”).
10. See Klein v. H.I.G. Capital, LLC, No. 2017-0862-AGB, 2018 WL 6719717, at
*3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
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corporate finance transactions.11 Also, the recapitalization allowed Bain to
reach approximately sixty-six percent of the voting power of the issuer,
combining the voting right of common stocks and preferred stocks.12 Neither
a special committee of independent directors was appointed for this purpose
nor did the outsider public shareholders’ vote on the transaction, which the
controller approved by written consent.13 Also, the structure of the
transaction resulted in allegedly incentivizing HIG to underprice the
preferred shares issued by the target in order to maximize the price at which
Bain acquired HIG’s shareholding.
In May of 2018, the Special Committee of the Board of CBS Corp., a dualclass Delaware corporation (“CBS”), entered into a series of actions that, if
successful,14 would have diluted the voting rights of the controlling
shareholder,15 National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), from eighty percent to
seventeen percent through the issuance of a voting shares stock-dividend to
the holders of both voting and non-voting classes of CBS shares.16 The
Special Committee claimed that its move was a response to a threat to the
corporation by NAI, as the Special Committee had not recommended the
approval of a business combination that the major shareholder had strongly
suggested.17 The Delaware Court of Chancery had to rule on NAI’s alleged
power to execute an amendment to CBS’s corporate charter aimed at
requiring a supermajority in order to approve a dividend, and therefore,
empowering the controller to veto the transaction at hand.18
11. See id. (“As long as Bain retains 50% of the shares of the Preferred Stock issued
in the Bain Share Issuance, its affirmative vote is required before the Company can pay
dividends other than dividends on the Preferred Stock; enter into a recapitalization, share
exchange, or merger; increase its indebtedness; or modify any provision of the
Company’s organizational documents that would adversely affect the powers of the
Preferred Stock, among other things.”).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL
2263385, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018) (“[T]he stock dividend would be conditional
‘unless and until the Delaware Courts decide on a record whether it is legally and
equitably permissible.’”).
15. Ms. Redstone — the controller — was entitled to exercise either directly or
indirectly (through her participation in NAI) the heavy majority of the voting rights
(approximately 79.6 percent) without holding a proportional economic interest in the
firm (approximately 10.3 percent of the economic stake). Id. at *1.
16. Id. at *2.
17. Id.
18. Id. (“NAI had executed and delivered consents to amend CBS’s bylaws to,
among other things, require approval by 90% of the directors then in office at two
separate meetings held at least twenty business days apart in order to declare a
dividend.”).
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These public firms’ cases illustrate how new equity issuances may affect
the ownership structure of a public corporation. U.S. law entrusts insiders
with great flexibility in approving the transaction, provided that the price is
fair to the corporation. This approach complies with the traditional view of
the dispersed public corporation, whose shareholders are mainly (or only)
concerned with the economic return of their investment rather than the firm’s
governance. However, this assumption is not accurate anymore with regard
to the ownership base of several corporations. Several shareholders are
concerned about dilution, and equity issuance is a powerful tool to address
the conflict of interests between insiders and outsiders. Managers may
employ this tool to dilute a noisy minority shareholder (e.g., an activist hedge
fund) in dispersed public firms or the controlling shareholder (if present)
against her will. In a different scenario, should the controller be or have an
influence over the decision maker, she may exploit the minority shareholders
and strengthen her position in the firm.
This Article studies the issuance of new equity in U.S. firms from a
corporate governance perspective and discusses how the transaction affects
the interests of existing shareholders. Since this Article focuses on listed
companies, it mainly considers Delaware law,19 although relevant rulings
from other states will not be disregarded when dealing with public firms.
The research uses a comparative method: U.S. legal framework — having a
unique approach in dealing with shareholders’ dilution with regard to both
the allocation of powers and shareholders’ rights — is compared to that of
European countries.20
After explaining how the transaction may be used to achieve insiders’
goals and arguing that the current U.S. legal framework does not adequately
protect the outsiders’ interests, Part V develops a normative narrative, taking
advantage of the comparative experience. Namely, this Article analyzes the
two main features (for the purposes of this transaction) of European Union
(“EU”) regulation — which maintains both the shareholders’ vote and the
preemptive right — and claims that U.S. law should set forth a voting
mechanism to approve new share issuances.
19. See DEL. DIV. CORPS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS 1 (2019), https://corp
files.delaware.gov/Annual-Reports/Division-of-Corporations-2019-Annual-Report.pdf
(showing that, among other things, 67.8 percent of all Fortune 500 companies are
incorporated in Delaware and eighty-nine percent of U.S.-based IPOs in 2019 chose
Delaware as the incorporation state).
20. Unless otherwise specified (e.g., when refences will be made to the rules of law
set forth by the European Union), the use of the adjective “European” throughout this
Article is meant to cover not only the countries of the European Union but all the
countries of the European area including, among others, the United Kingdom, whose
approach to the transaction at hand will often be considered.
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Recent legal scholarship has extensively analyzed all the transactions
reallocating control rights in controlled public firms.21 Other authors have
studied the preemptive right in new share issuances, discussing its
application and limits.22 The scope of this Article is not related to the
governance problems of a specific type of firm, but rather it focuses on a
single transaction (i.e., new share issuances) and extensively covers its
application to both controlled and non-controlled firms. While the ultimate
goal is to develop a comprehensive legal framework regulating this
transaction as a whole, the voting mechanism that this Article suggests
requires a different framing depending on the allocation of powers in the firm
and who should be deemed outsiders in the transaction.
The remainder of this Article is divided as follows: Part II explains
shareholders’ concerns about the dilution resulting from the issuance of new
shares; Part III positions the issue within the traditional corporate governance
conflict between shareholders and managers; Part IV describes the current
shareholder powers in the issuance of new shares and their limits; Part V
proposes a new legal framework providing for increased powers; and Part
VI concludes.

21. See generally Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016) [hereinafter Goshen & Hamdani,
Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision] (positing a new framework of corporate
control that emphasizes control of entrepreneurs, which allows them to pursue their
idiosyncratic vision); Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class,
and the Limits of Judicial Review, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (2020) [hereinafter Goshen
& Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class] (assessing the reallocation and valuation of
control rights and suggesting a stronger reliance on the interpretation of the corporate
charters with regard to the allocation of powers to approve such reallocations); Zohar
Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018) [hereinafter Goshen & Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority
Protection] (contending that minority protection must be balanced with enabling
entrepreneur-controllers to pursue their vision); Geeyoung Min, Governance by
Dividends, 107 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author) (analyzing the
impact of stock dividends on corporate control in dual-class companies from a policy
perspective); Lefteri J. Christodulelis, Note, Seizing the First-Mover Advantage:
Resolving the Tension in Delaware Law Between Boards of Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2020) (examining the tension created from
transferring control to shareholders).
22. See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, Issuing New Shares and Preemptive Rights: A
Comparative Analysis, 12 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 517, 518 (2013) (examining the
differences between the United States and European countries in the limits applied to
directors’ power to issue new shares and regulate preemptive rights).
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II. THE DILUTION ISSUE FROM SHAREHOLDERS’ PERSPECTIVE
A plethora of economic literature has delved into the topic of the issuance
of new shares, pointing out its genuine feature to be a valuable financing
method to raise new equity capital.23 However, the transaction, depending
on its structure, may become a powerful tool for the firm’s decision maker,
strategically affecting the ownership structure of the issuer. This Part deals
with the existing shareholders’ perspective on the dilution: Section A
focuses on the economic meaning of the term according to Delaware case
law and literature; Section B positions the current U.S. legal framework
regulating new stock issuances in the comparative context; and Section C
suggests that the Delaware approach to dilution is not any more responsive
to the concerns of a less dispersed ownership structure.
A. Dilution Meaning in Delaware Law
The term “dilution” should be split into two different, although connected,
meanings depending on whether the focus is on financial or voting rights.
i. Economic Dilution
An existing shareholder is economically diluted whenever the overall
value of the shares she holds before the issuance decreases because of the
transaction. This effect occurs should both of the following requirements be
met: (i) the price of the newly issued shares is lower than the market value
of the outstanding shares before the transaction; and (ii) the shareholder does
not purchase a fraction of the newly issued shares at least equal to the fraction
of the shares she originally held (i.e., she does not participate at least prorata in the new shares issuance). In fact, a claim for economic equity dilution
must be factually based “on the theory that the corporation, by issuing
additional stock for inadequate consideration, made the complaining
stockholder’s investment less valuable.”24
ii. Voting Dilution
An existing shareholder experiences a voting power dilution whenever her
fractional voting power declines because of the issuance. However, in this
23. See generally Woojin Kim & Michael S. Weisbach, Motivations for Public
Equity Offers: An International Perspective, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 281 (2008) (studying the
different industrial and financial reasons underlying the decision to issue additional
equity).
24. Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 732 (Del. 2008); see also Cirillo Fam. Tr. v.
Moezinia, No. 10116-CB, 2018 WL 3388398, at *16 n.153 (Del. Ch. July 11, 2018)
(citing Feldman v. Cutaia, 956 A.2d 644, 655 (Del. Ch. 2007), aff’d, 951 A.2d 727 (Del.
2008)).
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scenario, the transaction does not have to negatively affect the overall value
of the stake that the existing shareholder held before the issuance. A
shareholder’s participation experiences a voting dilution when: (i) the price
of the newly issued shares is equal to or above the market value of the
outstanding shares; and (ii) the shareholder does not proportionally purchase
the newly issued shares.25
Arguably, although the relationship is not reciprocal, the experience of
economic dilution is conditioned upon the occurrence of voting dilution (i.e.,
the transaction must negatively affect the fractional ownership of the
shareholder in the firm). In fact, otherwise, in the event of an underpriced
issuance, any loss in the value of the shareholder’s existing stake is offset by
the capital gain that she captures through the purchase of a proportional
fraction of the new, underpriced issuance.26
Finally, in response to a claim by an allegedly diluted shareholder, a third
kind of dilution has been theorized in the context of a Delaware case, the socalled “market price dilution”:27 this is the only supposed dilution scenario
where a shareholder suffers a decline in the value of her participation without
having her fractional voting rights reduced. In fact, such loss is identified by
the fall of the market price of the already issued and publicly traded stocks
of the company that occurs following the issuance. Reasonably, such alleged
“dilution” is not a direct consequence of the issuance on the shareholder’s
participation, but of its impact on the market price of the securities. In other
words, it does not result from the transaction itself but from the market’s
perception of its announcement. The court in its ruling explained the decline
in the stock price as a consequence of the increase in the overall number of
the issuer’s shares offered on the market and explicitly endorsed the theory
that the demand for the equity securities of a firm is “downward sloping and
elastic.”28 Several scholars agreed on this intuition and some of them

25. See Mira Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 701, 708
(2011) [hereinafter Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock] (explaining voting right dilution
and economic dilution); Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 517.
26. See Mike Burkart & Hongda Zhong, Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution 3
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 636/2019, 2019) (noting that the
feature of preemptive rights is that as long as the existing shareholders fully exercise
their rights, no dilution shall occur, and wealth transfers can be avoided); see also infra
Section V.A (elaborating further on the statement in the context of the preemptive rights
analysis).
27. See Ford v. VMware, Inc., No. 11714-VCL, 2017 WL 1684089, at *20 (Del. Ch.
May 2, 2017) (suggesting the use of the label “market price dilution”).
28. Id. (considering the decline in price as the consequence of (i) a “downward
sloping and elastic” demand curve for the issuer’s shares and (ii) an increase in the supply
of the assets, which may occur even though the issued shares belong to a different class).
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corroborated such a price-pressures hypothesis with empirical evidence.29
Other studies argued that stock price reduction is the ultimate consequence
of the market’s perception that the issuance of shares arises from a board of
directors’ convincement that the stock is overpriced: in the context of
asymmetric information, the market negatively reacts to the transaction.30
While the scope of this Article does not cover the ultimate economic
explanation of the decline in securities price following the stock issuance, it
is useful to point out how this “market price dilution” shall not be considered
within the dilution issues that this Article analyzes. In fact, taking advantage
of the wording of the Delaware Court’s reasoning, this “new” dilution
concept does not meet the requirement that the company “issue equity that
reduces the relative ownership or voting power of the pre-issuance
holders.”31
B. Dilution Protection in Delaware Law: A Comparative Perspective
New share issuances may adversely affect shareholders’ interests in
several ways, including by:
(i) transferring wealth from existing
shareholders to the purchasers of new shares; (ii) diluting voting power; and
(iii) weakening managers’ degree of accountability towards shareholders.32
Reasonably, only the first item belongs to the category of the economic
dilution since items sub (ii) and (iii) may result even from a non-underpriced
issuance. As a general approach, corporate law is required to address the
conflict between the need of the corporation to raise additional capital and
the protection of the existing shareholders from dilution. From a policy
perspective, a legal system may address this issue in two different ways
depending on the nature of the tool that shareholders are granted. Under a
29. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN.
579, 589 (1986); Clifford G. Holderness & Jeffrey Pontiff, Shareholder Nonparticipation in Valuable Rights Offerings: New Findings for an Old Puzzle, 120 J. FIN. ECON.
252, 265 (2016) (“There is considerable evidence of downward sloping supply curves
for shares of stock.”); cf. Myron S. Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution
Versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. BUS. 179,
207 (1972) (arguing that regressions support the substitution hypothesis against the
selling-pressure hypothesis).
30. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and Offering Dilution,
15 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 62 (1986) (reviewing and summarizing several theories on the point
debated as of the date of their essay); Massimo Massa et al., Rights Offerings, Trading,
and Regulation: A Global Perspective 3 (INSEAD, Working Paper No. 2013/120/FIN,
2013); Holderness & Pontiff, supra note 29, at 264–66 (exposing further findings
concerning the stock price reaction and the negative information that the market infers
about the narrower case of a nontransferable rights offering).
31. Ford, 2017 WL 1684089, at *20.
32. See EILÍS FERRAN & LOOK CHAN HO, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE LAW
105 (2d ed. 2014).
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property rule protection, shareholders may not be expropriated of their assets
without their consent, regardless of the consideration that they receive;
therefore, they cannot be deprived of their voting rights absent their vote as
a class.33 By contrast, the liability rule protection consists of a deal-oriented
approach that enables the decision maker to expropriate the shareholders as
long as they receive a fair price in exchange.34 Although the majority of the
legal scholarship has addressed the dichotomy in the context of the conflicted
transaction, it is also arguably applicable to new equity issuances, as the
comparative analysis between different countries confirms.
The U.S. legal framework — adopting a liability rule — is more focused
on protection from the economic dilution rather than from the voting one.35
To begin with, U.S. rules generally empower directors with the decision to
issue new shares and seldom require the approval of the shareholders.36
Also, existing shareholders are generally not granted the right to participate
in the new issuance: in fact, the preemptive right is not either a mandatory
or a default provision, and its adoption is very rare in public firms.37 Namely,
the most effective limit on managers’ discretion and the most powerful
protection of shareholders’ interests relies on the application of directors’
33. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV 1089, 1092 (1972)
(“An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes
to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction
in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.”); see also Zohar
Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality,
91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 398 (2003) [hereinafter Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling
Corporate Self-Dealing] (applying the notion of property rules to group rights and the
corporate organization); Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic
Vision, supra note 21, at 601 (analyzing the property rule protection from the controlling
shareholder’s perspective).
34. Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing, supra note 33, at
398 (“A liability rule allows transactions tainted with self-dealing to be imposed on an
unwilling minority but ensures that the minority is adequately compensated in objective
market-value terms.”).
35. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 134 (2d ed. 2010) (“[T]he more
frequent concern is the potential dilution of the economic worth of the existing shares.”).
36. E.g., In re Nine Sys. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 3940-VCN, 2014 WL 4383127,
at *28 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (“Delaware law endows the board — not a controller —
with the exclusive authority to manage and direct the corporation’s business affairs, the
foremost example of which is the power to issue stock.”); Grimes v. Alteon, Inc., 804
A.2d 256, 261 (Del. 2002) (“Taken together, these provisions confirm the board’s
exclusive authority to issue stock and regulate a corporation’s capital structure.”). See
infra Part IV for a discussion of the main cases triggering the shareholder vote.
37. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 17.1.4 (1986); see Edward Rock
et al., Fundamental Changes, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 171, 182 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter Rock et al.,
Fundamental Changes].
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fiduciary duties to the transaction.38 By contrast, the default rules of other
legal frameworks, including those of EU countries, provide for a two-fold
interaction with the shareholders’ meeting in that they set forth both the
shareholders’ vote and the preemptive right.39 This broader autonomy that
U.S. rules grant to the managers is consistent with the overall approach to
corporate law: as a seminal comparative corporate law study has pointed
out, “EU law and, to some extent Japanese law, accord more attention to
[the] management-shareholder conflict in regulating corporate decisions
than does the law of U.S. jurisdictions.”40
However, this manager-friendly attitude proves to have some flaws.
Namely, the entire fairness standard is the highest burden that the issuance
of new shares currently may have to meet, should the business judgment rule
not apply to the transaction, and it mainly consists in an ex-post analysis that
the courts carry out on the transaction consideration.41 Although this rule
might seem effective in incentivizing managers to set an issuance price that
is fair to the corporation, two different issues may arise.
First, courts apply the entire fairness standard only if they find the
transaction to be self-dealing.42 This approach assumes that absent a conflict
of interest, the issuance price is fair. However, satisfying the burden of proof
that the transaction is self-dealing is often a problematic task and even a nonself-dealing transaction might harm (certain) shareholders.43 The abovementioned case Corwin v. British American Tobacco PLC44 witnessed
38. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 183 (arguing that the
duty of loyalty can be at least as effective as preemptive rights, provided that private
enforcement institutions are effective); Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 527 (pointing out
the power and flexibility of the fiduciary duties in limiting managers’ discretion in the
issuance of shares).
39. See Directive 2017/1132, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14
June 2017 Relating to Certain Aspects of Company Law, 2017 O.J. (L 169) 80
(“[D]ecision by the general meeting on the increase of capital”); id. at 81 (“Increase in
capital by consideration in cash”).
40. Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 202.
41. See Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing, supra note
33, at 403 (“The fairness-test protection is no more than a guarantee that the transaction
will be fair . . . .”); Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21,
at 950 (explaining that the entire fairness review is a two-fold scrutiny test concerning
both the process underlying the transaction (“fair dealing”) and the transaction price
(“fair price”)).
42. See Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing, supra note
33, at 397; Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 975
(explaining how the entire fairness standard governs self-dealing).
43. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 43) (noting that the majority of the cases
of directors amending the governance structure of the firm through the distribution of
dividends did not witness an express conflict of interest).
44. 821 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 2016).
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similar circumstances.45 In fact, not only did public shareholders incur a
dilution of their voting rights as a result of the issuance but also the economic
terms of the transaction seemed to favor the subscriber (and alleged
controller) British American Tobacco, which was able to purchase the new
shares at a price cheaper than the closing price of the issuer’s trading price
on the day before the signing of the transaction46 at a “negative 4.8%
premium.”47 Therefore, when the transaction closed, British American
Tobacco — due to the further rise in the stock’s market price — secured a
profit equal to approximately $920 million, which it did not share with the
other shareholders.48 However, Reynolds American’s public shareholders
failed to prove breach of fiduciary duties in the transaction by either the
board of directors or British American Tobacco. Namely, both the North
Carolina Business Court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the action
against Reynolds American managers, respectively, on the merits and due to
lack of standing.49 With regard to British American Tobacco, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina stated that it was not a de facto controlling
shareholder50 in spite of, among other things, its forty-two percent
shareholding veto power over the board and role as the main source of equity
financing for the issuer; furthermore, it had allegedly behaved aggressively
towards the managers in the context of the transaction.51
Second, even if the court found the transaction to be self-dealing, there are
instances when a fair issuance price does not prevent the transaction from
discriminating within the shareholders’ class and undermining certain
shareholder interests.52 Indeed, it has been argued that a troublesome
situation arises — and the shareholders’ protections prove to be insufficient
— in the event of a selective sale of the new shares to some existing or new
shareholders, provided that the issuance price is fair to the corporation.53 To
this extent, under Delaware law, the firm’s decision maker is empowered to
effectively issue new shares (to herself or sympathetic investors) and shift
the control of the firm, without dealing or negotiating with the minority
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 733; see also supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
Corwin, 821 S.E.2d at 742.
Id. at 751 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco, 796 S.E.2d 324, 328–29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 338.
See Corwin, 821 S.E.2d at 743.
Id. at 753–54 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
See infra Section II.C.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 528 (mentioning other problematic cases, such
as the issuance of new “shares to themselves at a fair price” or of the offer to existing
shareholders exploiting those who lack funds, although in such cases, a possible and
adopted solution consists of requiring a business purpose for the transaction).
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shareholders (nor the independent directors), but only the court scrutinizes
the fairness of the transaction’s price.54 On a firm level, it has been pointed
out that the valuation of a corporation is a problematic task for courts due to
the lack of a universal method applicable to all the cases.55 Furthermore, on
a shareholder level, as the following Parts further explain, certain existing or
prospective shareholders are willing to subscribe new shares even at a price
above the fair market value.56 Authoritative professors recently addressed
the issue, claiming that the entire fairness standard — usually applied to selfdealing transactions — should not be applied to a transaction reallocating
control rights since, among other things, the value of control rights is highly
subjective.57 Accordingly, economic models that help courts assess the fair
price of the reallocation of control rights “do not exist” differently from what
happens in the case of a sale and purchase of assets or entire firms.58
Arguably, the same reasoning should apply to strategic issuances, which shift
the voting rights regardless of whether the ownership structure of the firm is
controlled or dispersed and the transaction entails a transfer of control. A
decline in the voting power may be a harm by itself even if the firm allegedly
receives a fair price; therefore, applying the entire fairness standard to a
dilutive issuance of shares that alters the ownership structure of the firm is
an inaccurate remedy. This claim is consistent with the argument of recent
research that points out how different shareholders value their voting rights,
distinguishing between dispersed retail shareholders who seldomly cast their
vote and active ones who accumulate them in order to seek corporate
changes.59
As mentioned above, this feature of the rules governing the issuance of
new shares flags a material difference between the United States and several
other countries, including the European ones. Multiple explanations might
54. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 975–
77 (addressing the case of the controller engaging in self-dealing transactions).
Arguably, the argument applies to all the cases where the decision maker of the firm or
the person controlling it engages in similar transactions.
55. See Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: Corporate
Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453, 496
(2017) (applying the reasoning to appraisal proceedings).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 170–88.
57. See generally Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note
21 (discussing how a test determining which reallocations are allowed and not allowed
will eventually revert back to business judgment review).
58. Id. at 946.
59. See Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance,
71 STAN. L. REV. 687, 695 (2019) [hereinafter Lund, Nonvoting Shares] (using the
argument as a ground to advocate a governance system that efficiently distributes voting
rights).
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be given to the point. In the context of a massive and detailed report carried
out on behalf of the United Kingdom government on the topic of new equity
issuances (“Myners Report”), it has been indicated that in the United States,
the main interest is public firms’ access to equity capital rather than
protecting shareholders from dilution risk.60 Arguably, in the United States,
the philosophies underlying the nature and the role of the public firm’s
shareholders are different from that of EU countries. In fact, there appears
to be a stronger conception of purchase of the equity securities61 rather than
of subscription of shares: while the latter commits the shareholders to the
execution of the corporate contract, the former shows a mere economic
interest in the corporation. The Myners Report found that in the United
States, “investors have the limited role of buying and selling without any
particular commitment to the governance or long-term strategy of the
companies in which they invest.”62 To this extent, EU laws tend to protect
the property rights of shareholders through mandatory rules, undermining
the flexibility of the managers in amending the financial structure of the
firm.63 A comparative study on freeze-outs pointed out similar differences
between the two conceptions and underlined the dichotomy between mere
financial and voting rights in the U.S. approach and the “pure ‘untouchable’
right of property.”64 While the freeze-out transaction is indisputably
different from new equity issuances in that its application is limited to
controlled companies and is an extreme change to the ownership structure of
public firms, the argument can be transposed. Namely, the bottom line is
that the U.S. legal system allows greater flexibility in the composition of the
shareholders’ base as long as the economic value of the shareholders is not
exploited.65
The described attitude might come from either a cultural and political
background or an economic landscape, where the majority of the public
companies used to have a fragmented ownership structure.66 To this latter
60. PAUL MYNERS, PRE-EMPTION RIGHTS: FINAL REPORT 17 (2005), https://webarch
ive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060213221519/http://www.dti.gov.uk/cld/public.htm.
61. Id. at 16 (explaining that in the United States, “investors have the limited role of
buying and selling without any particular commitment to the governance or long-term
strategy of the companies in which they invest”).
62. Id.
63. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 542.
64. Leonardo Pinta, Note, The U.S. and Italy: Controlling Shareholders’ Fiduciary
Duties in Freeze Out Mergers and Tender Offers, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 931, 936 (2011).
65. See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 407, 413 (2006) (listing economic rights as one of four “fundamental rights”
shareholders have under current law).
66. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 542 (suggesting the theory as one of the
possible explanations for the different approaches to preemptive rights in the United

16

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

extent, the paradigm of the so-called Berle-Means corporation — as defined
by Professor Roe — is a public company with dispersed public
shareholders.67 This model results in two main consequences: (i) the power
of the managers is strong; and (ii) given that the legal system and the market
tend to develop together, the former sets forth provisions protecting the
dispersed public shareholders from the managers, based on what were
perceived as their main concerns.68 The U.S. approach perfectly complies
with the perception of the so-called Berle-Means corporation, treating the
shareholders as investors with the underlying assumption that they do not
consider protection from dilution of their respective fractional voting rights
a critical priority. This seems to fit within the definition of fragmented
dispersed shareholders, who are concerned about the exploitation of the
value of their respective investment and likely deem less problematic the
reduction in the strength of their respective voting power since, individually,
each shareholder is capable of having only a trivial effect on the vote of the
shareholders as a class. Section II.C, however, exposes how this model is
not any more representative of the majority of U.S. public firms.
While the reason underlining the peculiar and flexible approach of U.S.
corporate law to new share issuances is debatable, the potential impact of
this transaction on the core corporate governance issues seems to be
undisputed. As a final remark, the Myners Report, dated 2005, suggested a
connection between the differences in the rules on new equity issuances
between the United Kingdom and United States and the features of their
respective markets, especially the degree of the shareholders’ involvement

States and Europe; in fact, in EU jurisdictions, shareholders have preemptive rights in
new share issuances as a default rule). Note that the Author does not find the explanation
fully convincing since it does not apply in the context of close corporations even if the
difference between the two systems persists. However, for the purpose of this Article,
the argument may still be valid. Indeed, the focus of this Article is on the overall attitude
towards new share issuances and the possible interests of public shareholders in avoiding
the dilution, rather than on the specific issue of the mandatory preemptive right provision.
To this extent, it does not seem unreasonable to explain the traditionally different
approach between the two jurisdictions with the different ownership structure of the
respective firms and the overall lack of interests of the Berle-Means corporation’s public
shareholders in keeping their voting power. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 196 (5th ed. 2000) (reporting frequent implementation of the preemptive
right in close corporations, therefore corroborating the intuition that a less dispersed
ownership structure might increase the interest in antidilution protections).
67. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 10, 12 (1991); Brian R. Cheffins, The Rise and Fall (?) of the Berle-Means
Corporation, 42 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 445, 464–70 (2019) (extensively reviewing the
reasons underlying the development of the Berle-Means corporation and its evolution).
68. See Cheffins, supra note 67, at 466–68 (reviewing the of evolution of the U.S.
legal system on the point).
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in the governance of the public firm.69 Indeed, it was claimed that the
stronger powers and responsibilities of the institutional investors in the
United Kingdom, as well as their more active involvement in the governance
of the participated firms and the set of long-term goals, enhanced their
interest in avoiding dilution.70 The following Section seeks to undermine the
premise of this statement — as far as it concerns the current scenario in the
United States — and point out that existing shareholders, given their features
and sophistication, carry an interest in avoiding dilution.
C. The New Ownership Structure of the Public Firm and the Enhanced
Shareholders’ Interests in Effective Anti-Dilution Protections
This Article claims there should be a distinction between the issuance of
new shares and other corporate deals such as the sale or purchase of corporate
assets.71 Namely, assessing an equity issuance in the same way as any other
possibly overpaid transaction, with the goal of understanding whether the
company received too little in exchange for its stocks, seems an
oversimplification. Regardless of the fairness of the price, each share carries
a value that is beyond its capacity as a tradable security.72 Therefore, an
issuance of new shares is capable of material impacts at the shareholder
level, even in a public company.73 Any equity issuance may affect the
position of the individual shareholder within the corporate entity, regardless
of the consideration that she receives. Arguably, the shareholders of public
corporations have an interest in restricting the flexibility of the managers and
downsizing the risk that they affect the ownership structure of the firm, with
the ultimate goal of either reducing the voting power of some shareholders
or strengthening their insulation.74
The analysis of the adverse positions and the incentives of, respectively,
69. See MYNERS, supra note 60, at 16–17 (describing the influence shareholders can
have in the United States).
70. See id. at 17.
71. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 12, 13) (exposing a similar reasoning with
regard to dividend distribution and stressing the “stock’s unique and powerful trait,”
since “stock comes with voting and other rights”).
72. See Robert Charles Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 776, 778 (1979) (“[O]ne who buys common shares of a company is in fact
purchasing not only a residual economic interest in the company, but also a share of the
voting power.”).
73. See Carsanaro v. Bloodhound Techs., Inc., 65 A.3d 618, 655–56 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(endorsing the principle that the impact of a new issuance is “felt primarily by the
shareholders”). Note that since the case involved a private corporation and the argument
was used to broaden the application of the Gentile ruling, stating that it is the majority
view of Delaware case law would be, at least, questionable.
74. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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shareholders and managers of the public company requires a caveat in order
to clarify the use of the terms. The main corporate tension, in the context of
an issuance of new shares, concerns that between the issuer’s constituencies
which, respectively: (a) are empowered to approve the issuance or can
substantially influence the decision (i.e., the insiders); and (b) have a passive
position in the decision and are exposed to the risk to have their own interests
negatively affected in any of the mentioned ways (i.e., the outsiders). To this
extent, the directors and officers of the firm will be considered together
within the corporation’s management in the category sub (a).75 All the
shareholders not exercising control in the firm are part of the category sub
(b). The most problematic task is the allocation of the controlling
shareholders in either of the two groups: although one would be tempted to
consider the controllers within the decision makers sub (a),76 this Article also
considers the case of a conflict between the board and the controlling
shareholder, with the former diluting (or trying to dilute) the latter against
her will.77 This Article advocates focusing on the specific transaction and
tries to distinguish the position that the controller — if existing in the firm’s
ownership structure — may have in order to assess whether she should be
considered part of the insider managers or of the outsider shareholders.
To begin with, the paradigm of the public corporation as an entity, whose
ownership structure is widely fragmented and whose governance mainly
witnesses an agency tension between the interests of the dispersed
shareholders and managers, is not accurate anymore.78 The massive
presence of institutional investors in the shareholder base has significantly
75. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118
HARV. L. REV. 833, 842 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power] (adopting this division while warning that within the broad category
of the manager, the interests of officers and independent directors sometimes differ and
pointing out that the increase in power of independent directors has been a salient
corporate governance topic throughout the years).
76. See, e.g., FERRAN & HO, supra note 32, at 205 (adopting this approach for the
purpose of the transaction at hand).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 192–203.
78. See Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP.
L. 493, 498–99 (2018) [hereinafter Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting]
(describing the fall of the Berle-Means corporation and the increasingly concentrated
shareholder bases); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency Problems of
Institutional Investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 92 (2017) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The
Agency Problems of Institutional Investors] (corroborating the argument of the increased
concentration with robust empirical evidence concerning the largest twenty U.S. public
corporations as of June 30, 2016); Edward B. Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 363,
365–67 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) [hereinafter Rock,
Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance] (exposing the transformation and the
concentration of institutional ownership in U.S. public firms over the last few decades).
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increased its average degree of sophistication and concentration.79
Authoritative scholars relied on such empirical data to claim the need for a
new set of corporate governance theories tailored to the current ownership
structures.80
While such institutional investors are not necessarily actively involved (or
according to some scholars, not enough81) in the governance of the firm, it
has been observed that they vote on core corporate governance matters and
often debate with the firm’s management on such issues.82 Recent studies
describe the business model of the institutional investors and point out how
the size of the stake they usually hold results in an interest in not missing the
opportunity to cast their determinative vote in an informed way in order to
beneficially impact the firm’s performance.83 Accordingly, the massive
economic value of their stake — coupled with a reputational argument to
attract additional assets under their management due to their “superior
79. See Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99
B.U. L. REV. 971, 973 (2019) [hereinafter Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of
Shareholder Activism] (exposing that “institutional investors today collectively own 70–
80% of the entire U.S. capital market” and that in an average large public firm, there are
“between three to five money managers, each holding approximately 5–10% of the
corporation’s stock. Other institutional investors . . . hold smaller percentages,
comprising together up to an additional 50% of the corporation’s shares”); Zohar Goshen
& Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263, 304 (2019)
[hereinafter Goshen & Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law] (arguing that the shift from
retail investors to large, sophisticated ones has resulted in a decline of the use of
Delaware courts).
80. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 863, 864 (2013) (“The canonical account of U.S. corporate governance, which
stresses the tension between dispersed shareholders and company managers in large
public firms, has become factually obsolete and now provides a misleading framework
for contemporary corporate governance theorizing.”).
81. See generally, e.g., Bebchuk, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors,
supra note 78 (claiming a lack of incentives for institutional investors in adequately
investing in the corporate governance of the participating firms).
82. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 887; Lund, The Case Against Passive
Shareholder Voting, supra note 78, at 501–02 (pointing out the influence that
institutional investors have on the governance of firms but also carefully distinguishing
between active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, arguing that
only the former are effective governance players).
83. See, e.g., Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, supra note
79, at 979–83 (“[T]he increase in size of the stakes owned by large institutional investors
suggests that money managers may capture substantial gains from improved share value
at portfolio companies.”); Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 59, at 717 (noting how
institutional investors that hold the majority of shares of U.S. public firms “have the
resources and sophistication to exercise their votes intelligently, as well as a financial
incentive to invest in monitoring and stewardship,” although excluding passive funds
from this group).
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returns” and recognize “faithful efforts” — creates an incentive in retaining
the voting power and participating in the corporate decisions even for the
passive funds, which charge the lowest fees.84 This trend is expected to
continue in the future. On the point, BlackRock’s CEO, in his 2018 letter to
the CEOs of the firms in their portfolio, committed to an increasingly intense
involvement in the engagement activity with the participated issuers since,
among other things, they may not easily dismiss their participation in
managing their index funds, contrary to what occurs in the active funds’
practice.85 The 2019 edition of the same annual letter pointed out the
materiality of “corporate strategy and capital allocation” as engagement
priorities,86 signaling that the institutional investors are increasingly seeking
a voice in business matters, not only in governance matters.87 A recent study
indicated that the increasing percentage of shares of the public companies
that index funds — a subgroup within the institutional investors — is
attributable to those index funds leaning towards shareholder
empowerment.88 The statement is consistent with the findings of an
empirical analysis, which pointed out the unprecedented rise in shareholders’
powers that the recent corporate governance charter amendments have
caused.89 This study and evidence, overall considered, suggests that such
84. See Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, supra note 79, at
981; Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance: Let
Shareholders Be Shareholders 12 (N.Y.U. Sch. L., Working Paper No. 18–39, 2019)
[hereinafter Kahan & Rock, Index Funds and Corporate Governance] (pointing out the
relationship between the size of the stake that index funds have and their incentive in
voting); id. at 31 (explaining how reputational incentives work in index funds’ structures
in order to gather the necessary information and properly vote).
85. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Exec. Off., BlackRock, to CEOs
(2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/a-sense-of-purpose/; cf. Lund, The
Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, supra note 78, at 516–17 (explaining her
skepticism about the commitment of the so-called “Big Three” to be increasingly
involved in the governance of the participated firms and corroborating her view with
economic data analysis on costs and staffing resources).
86. Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman and Chief Exec. Off., BlackRock, to CEOs
(2019), https://www.blackrock.com/americas-offshore/en/2019-larry-fink-ceo-letter.
87. Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, supra note 79, at 976.
88. See John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem
of Twelve 1 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No. 19–07, 2018) (“Against that real-world
benchmark, indexation represents a significant shift towards more shareholder power,
not less.”); William B. Bratton & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of
Efficient Market Control, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 675, 677 (2020) (“The rise of hedge
funds and other activist investors has brought an unprecedented shift in power from
managers to shareholders, who are now empowered to determine business decisions at
publicly traded companies.”); cf. Cheffins, supra note 67, at 447 (claiming that the
overall paradigm of the public corporation has not changed so materially that it has
changed the passivity of the shareholders).
89. Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 43 J.
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empowered and relatively more involved shareholders do not lack interests
and incentives in limiting managers’ power to dilute their voting influence
at will.90 Namely, the several claims for an improved set of corporate
governance principles addressing the change in the status of the public
shareholders should not undermine the possible effects of the managers’
amendments to the ownership structure itself. In fact, any increase in — or
any claim to increase — the shareholders’ powers and their engagement in
the public companies’ governance should not disregard the importance of a
fundamental transaction, such as the issuance of additional shares, where the
ultimate impact is similar to the creation and purchase of votes.91 To this
extent, fundamental transactions are the premise of any case of shareholder
involvement in the governance of the firm.
As a general remark, several of the established powers of common equity
shareholders have a direct and proportional relationship to the size of the
voting stake that the shareholder holds, including: the right to vote on
directors’ elections and mergers, to start a proxy fight, or to propose a
governance action, as well as to threaten any of these in order to capture
managers and directors.92 On the point, it has been indicated how a share
equal to at least twenty-five percent of the issuer’s stock would empower the
holder to block “empire-building” acquisitions and to exercise a strong
influence over the management of the firm and, in extreme circumstances,
remove the managers.93 It has been pointed out that, when informed and
motivated institutional investors hold voting shares, they are usually able to
achieve a certain degree of influence over the management of firm, despite
their belonging to the minority; however, the large majority of their tools
build on their voting rights.94 Therefore, minority shareholders with a
significant stake in the context of new share issuances might fear losing their
blocking rights and seek to aggressively purchase additional shares.95

CORP. L. 289, 303–05 (2018).
90. See generally Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25 (discussing
multiple powers of shareholders and their ability to protect their interests so that their
voting rights are not diluted).
91. See id. at 733.
92. See Coates, supra note 88, at 6 (exposing the rights that common equity
shareholders enjoy).
93. Roe, supra note 67, at 12–13.
94. See Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 59, at 741 (mentioning, among other
things, the submission of a shareholder proposal, the “vote against board nominees or
executive compensation,” and the veto of a fundamental change).
95. Jesse M. Fried & Holger Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive
Rights, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 353, 363 (2020) [hereinafter Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock
Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights].
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However, this is not always possible, at least in a cost-effective way.96 The
intuition of the shareholders’ interests in avoiding voting dilution is
supported by the results of a relatively recent economic analysis, which
found that shareholders holding more than five percent of the voting rights
of a public firm fear dilution of their voting influence that may occur because
of the issuance.97 Note that the case of shareholders whose voting rights
exceed five percent captures not only the controlling shareholders but also
the significant minority ones.
The bottom line is that there are two main instances when a public
corporation’s shareholders are concerned about the dilution of their
fractional voting power. The first instance involves shareholders who are
concerned about dilution are controlling shareholders or, broadly,
shareholders who seek to pursue control of the firm. The second and more
problematic instance is where one of the shareholders does not seek control
but rather aims to exercise influence over the managers without pursuing
control. Professors Armour and Cheffins pointed out the distinction between
investors seeking influence and those seeking control and their respective
business models.98 Namely, investors seeking influence usually purchase a
block that, although does not grant the control of the corporation, enables the
investor to exercise pressure over management to achieve changes that are
ultimately oriented at increasing the shareholders’ value.99 According to an
article within this category, hedge funds seek broader influence than the
influence usually exercised by institutional investors.100 Thus, the position
of hedge funds is in a sort of grey area between plain influence and “actual
legal control.”101 The development of the market for influence — which
investors that “use the influence that accompanies their large ownership
positions to discipline management” mainly participate — led to the
broadening of the spectrum of the shareholders carrying an interest in
retaining their voting power in order to influence the managers, even if such
influence is not strong enough to impose any decision (as otherwise is the

96. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 140–48, 170–88.
97. Thomas Poulsen, Corporate Control and Underinvestment, 17 J. MGMT. &

GOVERNANCE 131, 132 (2013).
98. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58–59 (2011).
99. See id. at 58.
100. See Anna L. Christie, The New Hedge Fund Activism: Activist Directors and the
Market for Corporate Quasi-Control, 19 J. CORP. L. STUD. 1, 14 (2019) (explaining how
these investors usually seek to actively change the target company either through a proxy
context or obtaining a seat on the board of directors).
101. Id.
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case for controlling shareholders).102
In conclusion, although the longer-term interest is often connected to the
financial reward, this Section claims that in the context of the public firms’
equity issuances, several shareholders carry an additional interest in retaining
their fractional voting power. To this extent, it supports the theory of Section
B103 that the entire fairness standard is not an appropriate standard for
transactions reallocating voting rights. In addition, a new share issuance may
carry the strongest corporate governance implications through the impact on
the fractional voting power of selected shareholders. Neutralizing these
impacts is the best way to reconcile the issuance of new shares with the
corporation’s original business purpose to raise additional equity capital.
Therefore, since the interest of the outsider shareholders to not experience
economic dilution is well-established and does not require any further
explanation, this Article analyzes the transaction considering either type of
dilution that the shareholders may experience. Part III focuses on the
opposite side of the transaction and describes the different incentives that
managers may carry in abusing their broad power of strategic issuances.
III. THE INCENTIVES OF THE MANAGERS
Opportunistic behaviors may influence managers’ decisions to approve a
new equity issuance. A seminal study indicated how this is a powerful tool
to bypass shareholders’ will through the dilution of their voting power and
perpetuate the interests of the managers: indeed, from their perspective, the
transaction may prove to be a useful tool to “build empires, entrench
managers, and dilute shareholder influence.”104
Arguably, the self-interest that managers might prioritize through equity
issuances belongs to the broader class of agency issues in public
companies.105 While articles dating back to the end of the twentieth century
assumed that in the specific context of equity issuances managers act in the
best interest of the existing shareholders,106 a recent finding suggests that
102. See Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, supra note 78, at 494–
95 (including within the list of participants in this market both institutional investors and
hedge funds).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 41–59.
104. Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 180.
105. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976),
reprinted in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000) (exposing the analysis of agency costs).
106. See, e.g., Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and
Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information the Investors Do Not Have ,13 J.
FIN. ECON. 187, 188 (1984); Merton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy Under
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new share issuances are not exempt from agency tensions and supports the
theory with empirical evidence.107 A previous empirical analysis in the same
field already flagged the case of managers seeking to sell new shares to
sympathetic investors through private placements with the ultimate purpose
of entrenching themselves.108 Furthermore, the heterogeneity of interests
within the shareholders’ class should not be undermined in light of the wellestablished majority-minority conflict in the public firm, which seems to be
even stronger in the context of this specific transaction. In order to point out
the incentives that might lead managers to approve strategic issuances to
affect the shareholders’ voting power, it is critical to understand the different
agency tensions that possibly arise between the managers and the
shareholders. Namely, this Section addresses separately — following the
established pattern in corporate governance literature — managers’
incentives in public corporations whose control is contested (Section III.A)
and those in controlled public corporations (Section III.B).109
A. Non-Controlled Corporation
The non-controlled public corporation is the traditional background of
agency issues and of conflicts between shareholders and managers.110
Although there are several cases of equity issuances merely in the best
business interests of the corporation, this Section focuses on the incentives
possibly underlying strategic transactions that managers enter into to exploit
either value or the voting rights of certain shareholders.
First, the competency to issue additional shares is a powerful tool in the
takeover context. The most famous strategic issuance in this scenario is the
poison pill, a defensive measure against hostile takeovers.111 Arguing in
Asymmetric Information, 40 J. FIN. 1031, 1034 (1985).
107. See Clifford G. Holderness, Equity Issuances and Agency Costs: The Telling
Story of Shareholder Approval Around the World, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 415, 433–34 (2018).
108. See Michael J. Barclay et al., Private Placements and Managerial Entrenchment,
13 J. CORP. FIN. 461, 481 (2007).
109. See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
supra note 21, at 564 (noting how the governance issues are different between controlled
and non-controlled corporations).
110. See id. at 589 (framing the allocation of powers and cashflow rights in a
dispersed-ownership structure and summarizing the agency concerns that apply to the
case since the tiny fraction of residual cash flows assigned to managers “exposes
investors to management agency costs, which are curbed by shareholders’ control rights;
that is, their ability to terminate management”). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk,
The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise] (arguing that shareholders are prevented from
effectively exercising their control powers).
111. Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 703.
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favor of, or against, the poison pill is beyond the scope of this Article and
prominent legal scholars have extensively addressed the topic during the last
few decades.112 The bottom line is that through the issuance of new shares,
the managers may disregard the will of shareholders and prevent the sale of
control of the corporation if they either deem it the best solution to maximize
the interests of the corporation or — building on the several studies on
agency tensions in public corporations — their own interests.113 Along the
same line of reasoning and with similar issues, managers may issue new
shares to favor the sale of control of the firm and avoid shareholder
opposition. The suitable tool would be the top-up option and, again, the
ultimate purpose might (although obviously does not have to) be to extract
personal benefit from the sale.114 In addition, future new shares have been
massively used in the context of merger and acquisition deals as a side
agreement to lock the transaction. Namely, extensive research on deal
protections illustrates that in recent public acquisitions, the acquirer has often
granted the target a loan that is convertible into common shares in the event
that the target’s board eventually decides to pursue another (more rewarding)
opportunity in the period between the announcement and the closing of the
deal, the so-called market canvass.115
Second, managers may find that equity issuances are a powerful tool to
dilute shareholders even in a non-control-acquisition context. Any
shareholder eventually interested in taking part in a serious and effective
112. Among the multiple studies on the poison pill, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The
Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54
STAN. L. REV. 887, 904–07 (2002), for a description of the poison pill and endorsing a
takeover-oriented position, Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian
Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733, 733–34 (2007), and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735–36 (2006),
which advocates in favor of the poison pill. See also Goshen & Hannes, The Death of
Corporate Law, supra note 79, at 266–69, 277–80 (carrying out an extensive review of
the historical evolution of the case law related to the poison pill).
113. See Alan K. Koh et al., Land of the Falling “Poison Pill”: Understanding
Defensive Measures in Japan on Their Own Terms, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 687, 694–702
(2020) (providing a detailed review of U.S. literature on the topic); Michael Klausner,
The Empirical Revolution in Law: Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1350–52 (2013).
114. See Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 704, 717–20 (defining
the top-up option as a call option that the board of directors of the target grants the bidder
in the context of a takeover in order to allow the latter to eventually complete a freezeout short form merger and pointing out the agency issues possibly affecting the
transaction).
115. See Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1043–1048 (2017) (noting that in one case, the conversion would
have allowed the prospective acquirer to hold 23.8 percent of the fully diluted shares of
the target).
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engagement activity is a potential threat to the incumbent managers, should
her agenda not overlap with management’s business plan. As already
mentioned, the legal literature agrees about the increased sophistication of
shareholders in the current framework of the U.S. public firm.116 A recent
essay described institutional shareholder engagement as a way to influence
the long-term strategies of the firm: while the essay pointed out how this
attitude differs from the more aggressive and, allegedly, short-termist
approach of the activist hedge funds, it also indicated engaged shareholders’
expectations concerning the board’s accountability and the firm’s
accomplishment of their goals.117 In addition, Professor Coates recently
argued that index fund managers — because of the indexation of ownership,
which has determined a rise in shareholders’ powers — now exercise a
strong pressure to influence the managers of a wide range of public
corporations.118 Professor Coates’s research indicated that there was
increased engagement of shareholders who connect with the board of
directors in order to disclose their policies and share their feelings about
managers and corporate activity.119 BlackRock itself, an investment
management corporation that has publicly committed to a model of
shareholders’ engagement based on an enhanced interaction with the board
for a few years,120 warned that if the expectations and the ideas that the
BlackRock Investment Stewardship team shared in the context of
engagement activity were not fulfilled, the team would not hesitate to vote
against management’s recommendations as a last resort tool.121 Not only do
116. See supra text accompanying notes 78–91.
117. See Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle

Approach in the Bebchuck-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 385, 392 (2016).
118. Coates, supra note 88, at 19 (“The bottom line of this influence is very different
than what the term ‘passive’ investment implies. Rather than blindly choosing stocks in
their index and then ignoring them, index fund managers have and are increasingly using
multiple channels to influence public companies of all sizes and kinds. Their views on
governance issues, their opinions of CEOs, their desires for change at particular
companies, their response and evaluations of restructuring or recapitalization proposals
from hedge fund activists — all of these matter intensely to the way the core institutions
in the U.S. economy are operating.”); see also Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, AntiActivist Poison Pills, 99 B.U. L. REV. 915, 940 (2019) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock, AntiActivist Poison Pills] (“[O]ver the last two decades, as the trend towards increasing
institutionalization of shareholding has continued, the largest institutions have awakened
to their power.”).
119. See Coates, supra note 88, at 16; Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance, supra note 78, at 381 (“[I]nstitutional investors are engaging with
management in a much more active way than ever before.”).
120. See, e.g., BlackRock: Ebb and Flow, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.ft.
com/content/ee2cd1d6-3e6e-11e8-b9f9-de94fa33a81e.
121. See BLACKROCK, THE INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ECOSYSTEM 7 (2018), https://
www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-steward
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these findings corroborate the argument that shareholders carry an interest in
avoiding dilution of their voting rights but also — and more importantly for
the purpose of this paragraph — this attitude is likely to make management
subject to duties of accountability and responsiveness towards sophisticated
shareholders, undermining its autonomy and possibly increasing its incentive
to approve dilutive equity issuances. Should the incumbent managers be or
feel threatened that such engaging shareholders support different
management in the medium/long-term, the incentive is amplified. On that
point, authoritative scholars have recently explained that the enhanced
powers of institutional investors in public firms’ governance have weakened
the position of managers who increasingly value any tool that empowers
them to affect the corporation’s ownership structure to insulate
themselves.122 The larger the stake the institutional investors have, the more
likely they are to have the power to replace the board of directors.123 The
case is further corroborated by the argument that when institutional investors
engage with the management of a company, the latter is aware that should
an activist campaign start in the future, the institutional investors have a
critical role in determining its outcome, and are likely to base their votes on
whether the firm had fulfilled the shareholders’ agenda.124
Many prominent practitioners and legal scholars have claimed that
shareholders with long-term targets are beneficial to the firm.125 From an
ship-ecosystem-july-2018.pdf (corroborating the report in some cases when BlackRock
effectively voted against management’s recommendation). Note that in all the instances
where BlackRock voted on a proposal against management’s recommendation, such
proposal was approved with a majority below seventy percent. See id. at 9. Therefore,
even a tiny dilution of the voting power might have fulfilled an assumed goal of the
managers to entrench themselves.
122. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 992
(applying the reasoning — in order to explain the creation of dual class structures — to
the case of the controller-manager fearing that she might fail to pursue her idiosyncratic
vision).
123. See Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, supra note 79, at
983 (“[C]orporate managers might become the ones that cannot risk their relationship
with the mutual funds complex, especially when all funds of the same fund family tend
to vote together.”).
124. See Coates, supra note 88, at 17; see also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at
896 (pointing to the pivotal role of institutional investors in activist campaigns and, more
broadly, the necessary interaction of activists and institutional investors in the current
ownership structure of public firms).
125. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, It’s Time to Adopt the New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 11, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/11/its
-time-to-adopt-the-new-paradigm/ (encouraging a proactive dialogue between the firms
and their long-term shareholders, who should also share their concerns and expectations
about the corporation, and arguing that the engagement between the parties should also
be sought before the submission of a shareholder’s proposal); Mallow & Sethi, supra

28

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

ex-ante perspective, the risk of such dilution is likely to discourage
shareholder engagement.
Among the different views of corporate
governance involvement that institutional investors have and should have, a
consensus developed over the significant investment of time, money, and
skills that engaged governance requires for a specific corporation.126 The
risk to be unduly diluted, should such effort result in an engagement not
complying with management’s plans, is not attractive. The argument is even
more applicable to any shareholder with a long-term view, given that she has
no certainty that in the future she will be able to keep her fractional voting
power in the event of a disagreement with management. In addition, from
an ex-post perspective, the effort of such engagement activities would be
pointless not only for the specific shareholder but for the corporation itself.
Namely, if the agenda of the engaged shareholder overlaps with
management’s expectations, the utility of the effort is marginal; by contrast,
should the activity result in a disagreement with the managers, the latter
might dilute the shareholder with no benefit for the corporation. In an
oversimplified way, the extreme scenario is that the board decides to “fire”
the shareholders through a dilutive issuance.
A similar reasoning applies, and its impact amplifies, if an activist
shareholder is in the ownership structure of the corporation.127 In such a
context, the incentives of the managers to dilute the incoming activist are
increased and reach their peak when the activist is reasonably confident of
success in a prospective proxy fight due to the support of some institutional
investors.128 Authoritative legal scholars have pointed out the importance of
a relationship between institutional shareholders and activist hedge funds:
while the activist hedge fund acts as the voice of the institutional
shareholders, the institutional shareholders are passive with regard to the
note 117, at 389–90 (providing a detailed definition of engagement); Rock, Institutional
Investors in Corporate Governance, supra note 78, at 371 (describing the efforts of legal
scholars and regulators aimed at addressing the lack of adequate shareholder
engagement).
126. According to many prominent scholars, the need for extensive resources prevents
many institutional investors from being more actively involved or effectively involved,
depending on the voices, in the corporate governance of the firms in which they
participate. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 872–73; Lucian Bebchuk & Scott
Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and
Policy, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2043–75 (2019) [Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds and
the Future of Corporate Governance] (developing an extensive analysis of the costs
incurred by index funds).
127. See, e.g., Rock, Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance, supra note 78,
at 382 (exposing the differences between hedge funds and “traditional” institutional
investors).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 78–91 (describing the institutionalization of
the shareholder base of public firms).
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corporate governance proposals but keener on exercising their voting rights
over the activist hedge fund.129 The hedge fund’s activist campaign may
originate from the dissatisfaction of institutional investors due to the failure
of management to address their priorities.130 In such a scenario, if the
managers fear defeat in the campaign, they might decide to dilute the hedge
funds’ shares, and the shareholders will be expected to support its campaign
through a material share issuance. Based on the usual business pattern of the
activists — which need to collect voting shares in order to claim corporate
changes that reward their initial investment131 — a decline in the voting
power negatively affects the activist’s odds of success. Managers may use
poison pills with lower thresholds as a weapon against the activist hedge
fund.132 Both Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio133 and
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht134 witnessed the adoption of a shareholders’
rights plan triggered at thresholds significantly below the majority control
— respectively twenty percent and ten percent — and tailored135 against the
activist possibly seeking to target the issuer with a proxy contest. In both
cases, the courts evaluated the threats posed by the activist and the
proportionality of the reaction and emphasized the risk of an underpriced
acquisition of a controlling issuer.136 Even if shareholders’ rights plans are
129. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 866–67; Lund, The Case Against Passive
Shareholder Voting, supra note 78, at 505 (pointing out that the consensus-seeking hedge
funds, in order to increase their odds of success in their campaign, often tailor their
agenda to the institutional shareholders’ priorities); Rock, Institutional Investors in
Corporate Governance, supra note 78, at 381 (exposing the change in the behavior of
institutional investors, who are now willing to support value-enhancing intervention by
the hedge funds rather than deferring to managers); Kahan & Rock, Anti-Activist Poison
Pills, supra note 118, at 940 (flagging that institutional investor support is an
indispensable condition for the activists’ success).
130. Hamdani & Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, supra note 79, at 988.
131. See Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 59, at 695.
132. See Kahan & Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, supra note 118, at 935; see also
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1069 (2007) [hereinafter Kahan & Rock,
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control].
133. 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010).
134. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
135. See id. at *20 (explaining the two-tiered structure of the pill, which was triggered
at a lower threshold if the purchaser sought to influence the control of the issuer);
Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 321 (granting an exemption to the company’s founder, whose
beneficial ownership was above the threshold triggering the pill).
136. See Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *17 (“I cannot conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that the Board did not make an objectively reasonable
determination that Third Point posed a threat of forming a control block for Sotheby’s
with other hedge funds without paying a control premium.”); Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 331
(“[T]he board’s motivation was to protect Barnes & Noble from the threat of being
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not technically traditional issuances of new shares (in the form of rights
offering), their effects are substantially similar in that, rather than diluting a
shareholder, shareholders’ rights plans prevent a shareholder from increasing
her voting power by threatening a dilution. To this extent, it has been pointed
out how the power to issue shares is often undermined in any discussion
concerning poison pills, in spite of being a critical part of it.137 Although
these plans are unlikely to be held as primarily aimed at interfering with the
shareholders’ franchise,138 their impact on the shareholders’ powers is
material. Note that in Third Point v. Ruprecht, other institutional
shareholders joined the hedge fund as plaintiffs, corroborating the theory that
at least some shareholders deem it critical to have a voice on these issues.139
Since this Article concerns corporations with publicly traded shares, the
immediate objection to this point seems that the “activists’ team” could
easily increase its stake and restore its pre-issuance voting power on the
market. Therefore, the equity issuance would prove to be ineffective.
However, Professors Gordon and Gilson’s analysis illustrates the flaw of this
response.140 To begin with, activist hedge funds seek an economic reward
from the increase in the issuer’s share price after their intervention.141
Empirical analysis found that as soon as an activist hedge fund discloses to
the public its purchase of a stake in a listed corporation, the trading price of
the issuer’s shares increases because the market moves forward and
incorporates a significant part of the purported beneficial effects of the
activist campaign into the short-term trading price.142 Therefore, it is critical
for hedge funds to be able to purchase a reasonably large stake ahead of the
trigger of the mandatory disclosure obligation.143 If the firm issues new
equity after the activist’s disclosure, the price of the new shares issuance is
subject to inordinate influence or even control by a bloc that emerged without paying a
fair price for that control. The effect on electoral rights was an incident to that end.”).
137. See Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 703.
138. See Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *16, *18.
139. Id. at *1 (“The other plaintiffs in this litigation are institutional stockholders who
purport to represent the interests of the corporation’s stockholders other than the hedge
funds.”).
140. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 902–06 (explaining the business model
of the activist investors).
141. See, e.g., Kahan & Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, supra note 118, at 920, 923–
24 (providing a detailed analysis of the business model of activist hedge funds and a
description of their concern in avoiding either type of dilution).
142. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 80, at 903 n.138, 903–05.
143. See id. at 904 (using the argument to challenge a proposed securities regulation
aimed at amending the disclosure obligation rule, both broadening its scope of
applicability and shortening the time for the investor to comply with the disclosure
obligation).
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likely to reflect such increase in the stock’s trading price.144 It is therefore
an obvious remark that, should the activist be willing to purchase on the
market, it purchases the shares at the new increased price, increasing the
overall average price per share of its stake. In other words, the activist’s goal
to secure a large position before filing the disclosure would be frustrated.
The described scenario undermines the investor’s action, forcing her to either
purchase additional shares at the increased price after the disclosure or,
reasonably, give up on her campaign.
In addition, since the activists are usually risk-averse and allocate a set
amount of funding, incurring an additional purchase is problematic even
absent an increase in the price per share.145 The argument that hedge funds
typically tend to avoid putting “too many eggs . . . in one investment basket”
supports that statement since an additional investment becomes necessary to
retain the significant minority shareholding that they need in order to be
effective when approaching the management of the corporation.146 This
argument on one side corroborates the case that hedge funds carry an interest
in not having their voting power diluted and, on the other, undermines their
potential willingness to increase their economic investment to retain their
fractional stake in the post-issuance ownership structure. Note that, since in
the scenario that this Section addresses, the purpose of the strategic
transaction is to generally dilute a specific shareholder or a block of them,
the managers do not need to issue shares to a specific investor, a so-called
“white squire.”147 Arguably, although the case of an equity issuance in favor
of sympathetic (with management) investors further strengthens the position
of the latter, even an issuance to investors in the general public is likely to
be effective in lowering the chances and increasing the costs of the to-bediluted shareholder’s ability to keep a significant stake and be successful in
its campaign. This feature not only avoids the difficulty of searching for a
white squire willing to incur a significant investment but also makes an
144. Id. at 903 (discussing how the price of the shares increases once an activist
discloses its purchase of stocks in a certain target).
145. See id. at 909–10.
146. Cheffins, supra note 67, at 487 (using the argument in order to explain the
relatively small presence of hedge funds in very large public firms and suggesting the
reason is they would need an excessive investment in a single company in order to “buy
up a minority stake sufficiently sizeable to capture management’s attention and to yield
meaningful profits in the event of success”).
147. The white squire is a tool used by managers who, seeking to secure their
entrenchment, selectively issue a block of shares to a sympathetic investor willing to
support them. See Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 731–32; Paul
Davies et al., Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 205, 214 (3d. 2017) (explaining the white
squire’s action, also called “white knight”).
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important argument in order to avoid the requirement of the shareholders’
approval that stock exchange rules set forth in the event of highly dilutive
equity issuances.148
In addition, the threat of such a dilutive issuance might be effective not
only in frustrating the result of an activist’s campaign but also, from an exante perspective, in discouraging their intervention at all. This Section does
not intend to take a position in favor of, or against, shareholder activism or
shareholder engagement.149 Contrarily, the purpose is to point out where the
incentives of managers to use the equity issuances to affect the ownership
structure of a dispersed public corporation lie and how such corporate
transactions are an effective and powerful means to achieve goals other than
the raising of funds for the corporation.
Finally, an equity issuance in a public firm whose control is contested is a
powerful tool regardless of the considerations on shareholder activism and
engagement. The above-mentioned case Reith v. Lichtenstein150 witnessed
the acquisition of majority control by a shareholder throughout the years.
The 2013 settlement agreement — which enabled Steel Holdings to be issued
new shares that, together with the warrants it was granted in the same
circumstances, approximately doubled its stake from 14.9 to 29.9 percent —
had a strong impact on the ownership structure of the firm.151
A last caveat is necessary. This Section did not analyze the hypothesis of
the quasi-controller who seeks the support of the board of directors in order
to pursue control of the corporation through the equity issuance, although it
formally pertains to the scenario of the public corporations whose controller
is contested. The next Section addresses this case.152
B. Controlled Corporations
Controlled corporations are becoming increasingly important in the U.S.
market,153 which has historically been different from the European one,
148. See infra Section IV.B.
149. See Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, supra note 78, at 502–

03, 503 n.41 (reviewing the literature on this debate); see also Kahan & Rock, AntiActivist Poison Pills, supra note 118, at 918 n.6 (“The effects of activism are likely to
differ systematically depending on the style of the activist; the type of target; the year
the activism took place; and, most importantly, the skills of a particular activist and
quality of the business plan it wants to pursue.”).
150. No. 2018–0277-MTZ, 2019 WL 2714065 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019); see supra
text accompanying notes 1–6.
151. Reith, 2019 WL 2714065, at *2, 3.
152. See infra Section III.B.i.
153. See Da Lin, Beyond Beholden, 44 J. CORP. L. 515, 520 (2019) (“According to a
2014 study by the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 54 of the 100 largest initial
public offerings between September 2011 and October 2013 were of companies with one
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where the percentage of controlled listed firms has always been large. The
definition of controlling shareholder encompasses not only (i) a shareholder
who owns more than fifty percent of the voting power of the corporation
(i.e., the so-called de jure control) but also (ii) a shareholder who owns less
than fifty percent of the voting power of the corporation but exercises control
“over the business affairs” of the corporation (i.e., the so-called de facto
control).154 While the concept of control over the business affairs of the
corporation has subsequently been refined and transposed to control over the
directors,155 the fractional voting power that a shareholder should retain in
order to qualify as a controller is still unclear.156 The class of controlled
corporations covers the cases of both concentrated ownership157 and dualclass structure: although this Article generally tends to consider the position
of the controlling shareholder regardless of the proportion between the
percentages of, respectively, the voting rights and the financial rights she
holds, this Article will occasionally distinguish between the two situations.
Generally, the presence of a controller in the ownership structure of the

shareholder holding more than 50% of the voting power. As of 2015, seven percent of
companies in the S&P 1500 index have one shareholder or group holding more than 30%
of the company’s voting shares.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable
Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 594–95 (2017) [hereinafter
Bebchuk & Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock] (reporting,
among other things, that as of July 2016, dual-class controlled companies in the U.S.
economy had “an aggregate market capitalization exceeding $3 trillion”); Jesse M. Fried,
Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, in THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 79, 79 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troger eds.,
2019) [hereinafter Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure].
154. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113–14 (Del. 1994) (citing
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987)); see
Reith, 2019 WL 2714065, at *21–23 (carrying out an analysis of the minority controlling
status); Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 953
(“Control rights are, broadly stated, rights to decide on the business direction of a
company, ranging from day-to-day operational to strategic management decisions.”).
155. See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293,
at *12–13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018) (reviewing the case law and applying the criterion).
156. See Goshen & Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, supra note
21, at 449, 449 n.1 (“In the United States, Delaware Courts have declined to quantify the
precise percentage of stock necessary to constitute an ‘effective majority’ [of the voting
rights], choosing instead to engage in a factual inquiry of the exercise of actual control
in each case.”); see also Ann M. Lipton, After Corwin: Down the Controlling
Shareholder Rabbit Hole, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1977, 1990 (2019) (carrying out an analysis
of the most recent case law and noting that “no particular level of voting power is
determinative” to assess the control status).
157. See Goshen & Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, supra note
21, at 449 (providing a definition of concentrated ownership structure as the firms where
the controller “holds an effective majority of the firm’s voting and equity rights” and
therefore flagging a material difference with the case of dual-class firms).
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firm has a sizeable impact on the corporation’s decisions.158 This makes the
statement that the main goal of corporate law in controlled corporations is to
protect minority shareholders largely shared and relatively undisputed.159
Controlling shareholders are generally subject to fiduciary duties as much as
the board of directors: transactions involving controlled companies trigger
the entire fairness standard if they are deemed to be conflicted, i.e., the
controller stands on both sides of the transaction and gets a “unique benefit”
from it.160 However, focusing on the issuance of new shares, it seems
reasonable to value the shareholder’s influence over the decision maker (i.e.,
the board of directors) with regard to the specific transaction. The ultimate
distinction is between the cases of: (i) the controller purchasing the newly
issued shares; and (ii) the controller not participating in the issuance. In fact,
the distinction determines whether the case falls in, respectively, the
majority-minority or the director-shareholder conflict. Notwithstanding the
different labels, it is critical to understand who the outsider shareholders that
the managers may seek to dilute are (i.e., whether the controller or the
minority shareholders) and who, if anyone, the managers have incentives to
favor. Arguably, since management is empowered to approve the issuance,
corporate law should broadly protect the shareholders who are not related to
the decision maker and whose stakes may incur a dilution because of the
issuance.
This Section aims to point out some of the possible incentives that may
lead the managers of a controlled corporation to use the issuance of new
equity as a tool to exploit either the financial or economic rights of the
outsider shareholders. Namely, this study covers both underpriced and nonunderpriced issuances, claiming that even the latter may prove to be a
powerful tool for the managers to perpetuate self-interests.161 Section III.B.i
158. There is an extensive debate in the literature concerning whether the presence of
a controller is beneficial or detrimental to the corporation, especially in the case of dualclass structure. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual DualClass Stock, supra note 153, at 596–99, 609–13 (extensively exposing the policy debate
on the topic and claiming that the potential benefits of the structure decline throughout
the years); Young Ran (Christine) Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation:
When Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-Offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 27–28
(2019) (reviewing the literature debate on the upsides and downsides of the dual-class
structures).
159. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried et al., The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller
Pay Tunneling, 138 J. FIN. ECON. 777, 778 (2020) [hereinafter Fried et al., The Effect of
Minority Veto Rights] (“[A] key governance objective is protecting minority
shareholders from tunneling by the controller.”).
160. See, e.g., IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL
7053964, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017).
161. However, when proposing the adoption of a new rule, the policy approaches in
the case of firms having concentrated ownership or a dual-class structure may be slightly
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analyzes the more customary case of the controller purchasing shares,
resulting in a potential harm to minority shareholders, while Section III.B.ii
addresses the case of the controller not subscribing the new shares.
i. The Purchasing Controller
The case of this Section is that the controller purchases more than her
ratable part of the newly issued shares and therefore increases her fractional
stake in the firm. To this extent, she should be allocated to the category of
the firm’s managers, and the involved agency tension presumably opposes
the controller-manager to the outside minority shareholders. Also, the
incentives of the managers in using the equity issuance to perpetrate abuses
are significantly different: in the analyzed hypothesis of the non-controlled
corporation, the managers were assumed to have the goal to entrench
themselves, build empires or, more broadly, retain their independence and
lack of accountability to shareholders. While the purpose of building
empires would still be valuable for the controller-manager,162 this case
carries a material difference since the board of directors is already under the
influence of the controlling shareholder and it acts in conjunction with her in
the customary majority-minority conflict.163 The controller-manager may
seek economic benefits as, respectively, a direct or indirect consequence of
the transaction, depending on the issuance price. This leads to the analysis
of two different scenarios, both of which involve the exploitation of value
from minority shareholders that the legal scholarship addresses as
“tunneling.”164
a. Cheap-Issuance Tunneling
The immediate way to shift value from minority shareholders to the
controller is achieved through the issuance of shares to the latter in exchange
for a low price, the so-called “cheap stock tunneling.”165 The case is very
different.
162. See Sang Yop Kang, Re-Envisioning the Controlling Shareholder Regime: Why
Controlling Shareholders and Minority Shareholders Often Embrace, 16 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 843, 869–70 (2014) (indicating both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of empire
building from the perspective of the controller).
163. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 355 (assuming management is under the influence of the controllers and seeks
to enhance their interests against those of the other investors).
164. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 571 n.32 (“The term tunneling refers to transactions, especially within a business
group or a pyramidal ownership structure, on terms aimed at favoring the controlling
shareholder.”). See generally Vladimir A. Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J.
CORP. L. 1 (2011) (providing for an extensive review and taxonomy of the tunneling).
165. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
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straightforward since the transaction provides the controller with a direct
economic gain. She is enabled to increase her financial and voting rights in
the firm, in exchange for a price per share below its market value. The
harmed parties are those who fail to participate (at least) pro-rata in the
issuance and are therefore diluted from both economic and voting right
perspectives. Arguably, the structure of the deal of Corwin v. British
American Tobacco meets these features.166 Namely, there is a reasonable
ground to claim that the issuance was cheap, given the virtual $920 million
profit that the purchaser was able to secure at the time of closing.
Furthermore, the express ruling of the Supreme Court of North Carolina —
relying on Delaware case law167 — that the subscriber was not a controlling
shareholder, does not exempt the case from being considered a cheap
issuance in a controlled company for the purpose of this analysis. In fact,
although the study of the standards to be met in order to be considered a de
facto controller is beyond the purpose of this Article,168 it seems worth noting
that the purchaser was a forty-two percent shareholder, with a significant
influence over the board,169 and did not share the profit with the outsider
public shareholders — whose shares were the only ones that the issuance
diluted. To this extent, the ruling corroborates the claim that the outsiders
lack adequate instruments to avoid exploitation of value and voting rights
from the most powerful shareholder of the firm.
b. Non-Cheap Issuance
The second scenario is met when the actual goal of the controller is to
obtain non-direct benefits from the transaction, which are not (or not
entirely) shared with the minority shareholders. The feature of the
transaction, therefore, is that the issuance price does not have to be unfair or,
in a more sophisticated way, is not below the market value of the firm’s
shares. Professors Fried and Spamann pointed out the case of a controller
seeking to dilute minority shareholders in order to strengthen her voting
power and cross a specific voting threshold, which, for example, is required
to approve certain transactions.170 In such a scenario, the issuance price
note 95, at 353; Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure,
supra note 153, at 81–83 (describing cheap-issuance tunneling as a transaction that
dilutes the minority shareholders who do not purchase their ratable portions of the new
equity in that the overall equity value of the firm is not sufficiently increased to offset
the loss in their fractional equity ownership).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9.
167. Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco, 821 S.E.2d 729, 737–39, 743 (N.C. 2018).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 153–57.
169. See Corwin, 821 S.E.2d at 753–54 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
170. Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
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might include a premium over the market value, provided that the benefits
that the controller obtains from the transaction are higher than the price she
is paying to purchase the shares: the shares would not be absolutely cheap
but would be relatively cheap from the controller’s perspective171 since the
transaction enables her to capture indirect economic benefits. Reasonably,
this situation occurred in Reith v. Lichtenstein since in 2017, the alleged
controlling shareholder strengthened its stake through an issuance of
convertible preferred shares whose conversion price was at a 31.5 percent
premium over the closing price of the traded stocks on the day before the
closing of the transaction.172 Notably, as a result of this issuance — coupled
with the equity grants to three directors affiliated with the same shareholder
— the purchaser was able to cross the line of majority control of the firm,
achieving a 52.3 percent stake.173
The same above-mentioned research addresses when the controller’s
benefits concern the use of the proceeds of the issuances (e.g., the new equity
is used to enter into an overpriced purchase from the controller).174 The use
of the proceeds of issuances is even more troublesome since it requires
neither a cheap issuance price nor the voting dilution of the minority
shareholders. However, for the purpose of this Article, it seems reasonable
to argue that the damage to the minority shareholders is not directly
perpetrated through equity issuances but rather through the use of proceeds
in the subsequent — although connected — purchase from the controller.175

note 95, at 362–63 (emphasizing the importance of voting rights in analyzing equity
issuances). Notably, the statement was not tailored to public corporations but seems
applicable in such a context too.
171. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 100 (introducing the concept of price-relativity in the context of new share
issuances in the case of securities that could be overpriced but still “effectively cheap”
for the controller).
172. Reith v. Lichtenstein, No. 2018–0277-MTZ, 2019 WL 2714065, *4 (Del. Ch.
June 28, 2019).
173. Id. at *5.
174. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 357–58.
175. Professors Fried and Spamann studied the issuance of cheap stocks from the
perspective of the asymmetric information issue in the context of the right offer. See id.
Therefore, the controller’s information about the use of proceeds (which in the
considered hypothesis was at her advantage) might effectively lead her to relatively
appreciate the shares in a different way compared to general public shareholders. See id.
at 357. Contrarily, the purpose here is to show how the managers of a public corporation
might damage minority shareholders with an equity issuance. In the example at hand,
unless the two transactions (issuance and use of proceeds in a related party purchase of
goods or securities) are considered as a whole, the position of this Article is that the
issuance by itself does not damage the minority shareholders.
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The non-underpriced issuance becomes more hybrid should the purchaser
be a quasi-controller — i.e., dominating but not controlling the firm176 —
who seeks to acquire control of the firm. In such a case, the quasi-controller
can extract massive benefits from the transaction177 and therefore is willing
to pay a material premium over the market shares.178 A corporate transaction
that Delaware courts scrutinized in 2014 witnessed this situation.179
Although the control of the corporation was contestable, the combination of
the securities, contractual rights, board representation, and relationships with
management that the shareholder Yucaipa American Alliance Fund II, L.P.
(“Yucaipa”) carried made Yucaipa a quasi-controller of Morgans, a Nasdaq
listed corporation.180 Among other things, Yucaipa held the majority of the
senior subordinated notes of the company — convertible in common stocks
starting from three months before their due date — as well as 100 percent of
the preferred stocks and warrants to purchase a non-trivial amount of public
stocks; furthermore, it had invasive veto rights on several extraordinary
transactions and was entitled to appoint one member of the board.181 The
transaction was structured as a rights offering issuance at a price that
provided an unusual twenty-six percent premium over the then-current
176. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 94–95 (providing as an example of a quasi-controller, the thirty percent
shareholder of a corporation whose second-largest shareholder has a twenty percent
stake). The notion of quasi-controller may belong to the same family as that of “effective
negative control,” which the Delaware Court of Chancery framed as a case of
shareholders exercising “disproportionate control and influence over major corporate
decisions, even if they do not have an explicit veto power.” Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,
No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014).
177. See Xueping Wu et al., A Rent-Protection Explanation for SEO FlotationMethod Choice, 51 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1039, 1040 (2016) (providing a
recent literature review of the studies concerning the private benefits of control); see also
Kahan & Rock, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, supra note 118, at 937–38 (“Unlike positive
control — which enables the investor who wields it to elect a board to its liking or cash
out minority shareholders and consequently justify special concerns about control under
Delaware law — negative control merely enables the wielder to block a limited set of
transactions that the board proposes.”).
178. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 95 (addressing the issue in the context of right offerings and explaining how
a quasi-controller in order to achieve control “may use an offer price that is clearly high
(or at least appears high) to deter other investors, including any potential rival, from
participating”). Reasonably, the same argument also applies to the case of the quasicontroller increasing her fractional voting power in a non-right-offering issuance.
179. See OTK Assocs., LLC v. Friedman, 85 A.3d 696, 704 (Del. Ch. 2014).
180. Id. at 724; cf. Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription
Disclosure, supra note 153, at 95 n.60 (mentioning the transaction as an example of an
overpriced issuance aimed at enabling the quasi-controller to gain control of the issuer
through a more-than-pro-rata subscription of the new shares).
181. OTK, 85 A.3d at 704.
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market price of shares.182 While the structure of the equity issuance as a
rights issue rather than as a cash offer183 is not critical in this Section, what
matters is that management allegedly acted in conjunction with Yucaipa to
maximize the latter’s odds to pursue the issuer’s control. Namely, based on
its financial advisor’s forecasts, Yucaipa was expected to reach a fraction
equal to thirty-five percent of the common stocks issued after the
transaction.184 Yucaipa sought to gain control of the corporation — at the
time challenged by another significant shareholder who subsequently was
the claimant in the Delaware dispute — through an overpriced issuance
aimed at discouraging many public shareholders from the subscription.185
However, in the context of the fight, Hyatt offered to buy all the shares of
Morgans, in exchange for a higher price (i.e., $7.50 per share against $6.00),
but the managers of the issuer ignored the proposal and avoided its
disclosure.186
Even if the control of the corporation is formally contested before the
equity issuance, this Article treats this transaction as if it were a controlling
shareholder’s subscription in light of the dominant position that a quasicontroller may exercise within the firm. The influence she is able to exert
over management — sympathetic with her goal to acquire control — further
confirms this intuition. Also, in terms of the possible damages that the
shareholders non-related to the quasi-controller may suffer because of the
transaction — and of the protection that a legal system needs to set forth —
the issuance proves to be close to the case of the purchasing-controller,
witnessing the board acting in conjunction with her. In fact, in both cases,
the firm’s ownership structure after the transaction provides for a controller
that has diluted the other shareholders’ shares through a strategic and
selective equity issuance approved by the board. Although the merit of legal
protections will be discussed later in this Article, in the mentioned case, OTK
v. Friedman, the court itself analogized Yucaipa’s influence to that exercised
by a controller: namely, “for purposes of the motion to dismiss, Yucaipa is
deemed to control Morgans.”187 The transaction was deemed to confer “a
unique benefit on a party exercising de facto control.”188
182. Id. at 707.
183. See Wu et al., supra note 177, at 1039 (describing the most common floatation

methods in seasoned equity offerings and their respective features).
184. OTK, 85 A.3d at 707.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 709.
187. Id. at 724.
188. Id. Note that depending on the definition of quasi-controller that is adopted, even
Reith v. Lichtenstein might seem to fall in this category as well as most of the cases of
minority controlling shareholders. However, the court expressly affirmed that Steel
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As a final remark, both controllers and quasi-controllers may have an
increased incentive in strengthening their position in the firm through a nonunderpriced (or an overpriced) issuance, in the event of an activist’s action.
As a dedicated research study explained, there are a non-trivial quantity of
cases of controlled companies that are subject to activist intervention.189
Although companies whose control is completely uncontested are not fully
insulated, the risk is even more material for de facto controllers — since the
activist may challenge them in a proxy fight190 — and, of course, for quasicontrollers.
As Part II pointed out,191 the current legal framework fails to protect
shareholders should the firm issue shares in exchange for a price that
Delaware courts deem “objectively” fair. This Section explained the
managers’ incentives and how they — acting in conjunction with the
controlling shareholders — may take advantage of this flaw to exploit the
minority shareholders. The following Section addresses the same flaw from
the perspective of managers who have the opposite goal of diluting the
controller.
ii. The Non-Purchasing Controller
The last case that this Article considers is the controller who does not
purchase the newly issued shares: the hypothesis in which the controller
decides to refrain from the subscription of the new shares for any reason,
including that she is seeking to exploit the minority shareholders or other
investors issuing overpriced shares (i.e., overpriced-issuance tunneling),192
but this is beyond the purpose of this Section since there is no harm to
Holdings was a controlling shareholder before the transaction and, more importantly, this
Article considers controllers and quasi-controllers in the same group. Reith v.
Lichtenstein, No. 2018-0277-MTZ, 2019 WL 2714065, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2019)
(“[E]ven if control is analyzed as of December 2017, when the board approved the
Challenged Transactions, it is reasonably conceivable that Steel Holdings was a
controlling stockholder, and that it exercised actual control over the Company for
purposes of the IWCO acquisition.”).
189. See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in Controlled
Companies, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 124–25 (2016); Lund, Nonvoting Shares,
supra note 59, at 741–44 (recommending a prohibition of only issuing the public nonvoting stocks because, otherwise, a firm may be able to ignore any external pressure).
190. See Kastiel, supra note 189, at 95 (“Activists may also threaten to challenge an
‘effective’ controller, who owns less than 50% of the voting power, by seeking board
representation despite the low ex ante chances of winning a proxy fight against an
effective controller.”).
191. See supra Section II.B.
192. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 356–58 (discussing extensively the advantages of controllers over minority
shareholders).
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outsider shareholders in their capacity as existing shareholders but only in
their capacity as new investors should they purchase the new shares.
Contrarily, this Section focuses on the scenario in which management seeks
the dilution of the controller in the context of the shareholder-managers
conflict. To this extent, in this Section, the controlling shareholder is not
considered within the category of the firm’s managers since, at least in the
specific transaction, she is an outsider (as is proved by the fact that the board
of directors can approve a dilutive issuance against her will).
Given that the controlling shareholder is presumptively not willing to lose
her status within the firm and part (or all) of the private benefits that result
from it,193 and that she is supposed to exercise control over the board, such a
transaction might seem extremely unlikely to occur. Indeed, several studies
on the point either implicitly or explicitly194 assume that the incumbent
controller retains a non-trivial role in the decision concerning the issuance of
new equity and therefore often analyzes such transaction from the
perspective of the controller who is seeking to structure the issuance in her
best interests.195 The assumption is well-grounded in the Delaware legal
framework where “the controller always has such power if she controls the
board and a majority of the shareholder votes, but board control by itself
often suffices.”196 However, the recent CBS v. NAI197 case witnessed a
shareholder having a majority of the voting power, but not effective control
over the managers, which proved to be non-deferential at least for the
purpose of the equity issuance, and entered into a firm reorganization aimed
at exacerbating the controller’s influence. 198
In this and similar contexts, the best interests of the corporation might
inspire management’s action: Delaware case law explicitly acknowledges
the power of the board of directors to dilute a shareholder should she
represent a serious threat to the corporation.199 However, although the
193. See Wu et al., supra note 177, at 1057.
194. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra

note 95, at 355.
195. See Wu et al., supra note 177, at 1049 (“[I]f the incumbent chooses a cash offer,
new equity is sold to outside shareholders, and the incumbent’s controlling ownership
will be diluted.”).
196. Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra note
153, at 82 n.10 (citing Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 709).
197. No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).
198. See id. at *1; supra text accompanying notes 14–18.
199. See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306 (Del. Ch. 1994) (recognizing the
authority of the board to dilute a controller in order to protect the corporation consistently
with its fiduciary duties); Ford v. VMware, Inc., No. 11714-VCL, 2017 WL 1684089, at
*32 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2017) (citing Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A2d 342,
387 (Del. Ch. 2004)); see also infra text accompanying note 367.
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explanation seems reasonable on a theoretical ground, the board might also
practically seek to dilute the controller for opportunistic reasons. There are
several instances of disagreement between the managers and the
shareholders that can result in an incentive of the former to weaken the
influence of the latter. The ultimate purpose might be either to perpetuate
their position or to have more autonomy in the firm’s strategic decisions.
Issuing blocks of shares to sympathetic investors is the most immediate
way to accomplish the goal, with the expectation that the new friendly
blockholders support management entrenchment.200 Notably, the emergence
of new blockholders is not restricted to transactions limited to one or a few
specific investors: it has been pointed out that the control-diluting equity
issuances generally structured as cash offers are likely to result in the same
effect.201 The same study also explained that in the event that an investor
seeks to exercise influence over an issuer, the new equity issuance may
facilitate her goal in that the odds of success are higher, and the costs are
lower, compared to the case of an ordinary purchase on the market.202
Accordingly, the ultimate goal of such intruding blockholders is often not to
carry out monitoring activities but rather to threaten the controller to share a
fraction of the control benefits.203 Therefore, taking advantage of the shield
of the threat to the long-term interests of the corporation, managers might
cause an undisputed fundamental change in the ownership structure of the
firm, such as a change of control, or at least a loss of control, which
undermines the influence of the incumbent controller.
The purpose of Part III was neither to advocate that the managers are likely
to perpetuate self-interests while issuing new shares nor to assume this
attitude but to point out that as much as shareholders have an interest in not
being either voting or economically diluted, the managers might have an
opposite opportunistic incentive to enter into selective issuances. Overall, it
seems reasonable to agree with the authoritative view that shareholders
might want to keep direct control of such corporate decisions.204 This is true
both in the context of a manager-shareholder conflict and of a majorityminority shareholder conflict: the legal rules should protect shareholders as
a class from exploitation by the managers and the minority shareholders —
200. See generally Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., Variation in the Monitoring
Incentives of Outside Stockholders, 49 J.L. & ECON. 651 (2006) (suggesting that
affiliated blockholders may be deferential with regard to managers’ entrenchment in
exchange for sharing control benefits).
201. See Wu et al., supra note 177, at 1041 (“[C]ontrol-diluting cash offers tend to
increase the probability for the emergence of new blockholders.”).
202. See id. at 1042.
203. See id. at 1056.
204. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 180.
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who face the most significant case — from exploitation by the majority
should the majority shareholders, as often happens, exercise significant
influence over the managers, who are entitled to approve the transaction.
Part IV describes the powers that the current legal framework grants to the
shareholders and argues that they fail to effectively limit managers’
discretion in affecting the ownership structure of the firm.
IV. CURRENT SHAREHOLDERS’ POWERS
Previous parts indicated that the U.S. legal framework provides the
managers of a public corporation with comparatively great flexibility and
discretion in issuing new shares. Shareholders do not have significant
powers neither in affecting the decision nor in determining the structure of
the transaction, and they mainly rely on the fiduciary duties that managers
— and, under certain circumstances, controlling shareholders — owe to the
corporation.205 However, managers’ powers in the issuance of new shares
are subject to two quantitative limits that, if crossed, trigger a mandatory
shareholder vote. This Part analyzes the cases requiring shareholder
approval to issue new shares, with the goal — building on the analysis
carried out in previous Sections — of critiquing the rules’ effectiveness in
limiting insiders’ discretion. Namely, this Part is divided as follows: Section
A delves into the voting power of shareholders that Delaware corporate law
sets forth; and Section B analyzes the shareholder vote requirement provided
by stock exchange rules.
A. Shareholders’ Vote Pursuant to Delaware Corporate Code
According to the Delaware Code, the board of directors of the corporation
may issue additional shares provided that the number of authorized shares in
the certificate of incorporation is not exceeded.206 Firms shall increase the
number of the authorized shares only through an amendment of the charter
of incorporation, which requires the approval of the shareholders.207 This
rule, however, does not prove to significantly limit the power of the
managers to effectively address shareholder interests.208
A relatively recent extensive analysis of the allocation of powers in the
equity issuances of Delaware corporations assessed the “magnitude of the
205. See supra Sections II.B, III.B.
206. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 161 (2020).
207. See Min, supra note 89, at 294 (“Under . . . the corporate law of all 50 states,

including the Delaware General Corporation Law, amending a corporate charter requires
both directors’ and shareholders’ approvals.”).
208. See GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 135 (pointing out the minimal protection that
this rule brings against the shareholders’ dilution).
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managers’ power” in the transaction by focusing on the “excess ratio,” which
is the ratio of the (i) number of authorized non-outstanding shares (i.e., the
number of shares that the board of directors is empowered to issue without a
resolution of the shareholders’ meeting) to (ii) the number of the outstanding
shares.209 The analysis shows an average excess ratio of 5.79 with regard to
non-financial corporations that went public in 2009, indicating that on
average, each of these companies at the time of the initial public offering
(“IPO”) had issued less than one-sixth of the shares authorized by the
corporation’s charter.210 It is an obvious remark that a very high ratio
significantly weakens the purpose and the value of the shareholders’ vote, in
that it is seldom required. The same study also suggests that the managers’
purpose to keep wide discretion in the stock-issuances may either result in
them refraining from issuing shares for business purposes — even when it is
the most suitable solution for the firm — or, more broadly, enhancing their
incentive by entering into any business transaction that has a positive effect
on the excess ratio (e.g., choosing share repurchases instead of dividends as
the form of cash distribution).211 Therefore, the managers’ power to affect
the ownership structure of the firm, combined with the agency tension
between the managers and the corporation as a whole, is capable of indirectly
creating distortions over their business decisions should their priority be to
retain or to enhance the magnitude of this power.
From a normative perspective, one might suggest imposing a cap on the
excess ratio to limit the magnitude of the directors’ power. However, that
proposal fails to address at least some of the above-mentioned issues. First,
it is reasonable to argue that the lower the excess ratio is, the more likely the
managers’ business decisions are to be influenced by their effort to retain the
power to dilute the shareholders’ shares in the future.212 Second, and more
importantly, the shareholders’ vote to increase the number of authorized
shares generally fails to distinguish between the several types of equity
issuances, and it is not contingent upon their different features (e.g., identity
of the purchaser and price). Therefore, it does not fix the flaws of the rule in
209. Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 740.
210. Id. at 741 (providing a table showing a median excess-ratio for the same

companies in the same year equal to 3.75 and a standard deviation of 5.13, which resulted
from some companies choosing to go public with a very high ratio and others choosing
a relatively small one, with the lowest at 0.34).
211. Id. at 705, 710–12 (explaining that since the managers do not have any power
over the number of authorized shares, their business decisions might be influenced by
the goal to increase the number of authorized and non-outstanding shares).
212. See id. at 742–43 (“[A] high ratio, which indicates a significant power in
managers’ hands, can be desirable to the extent that it allows the managers to issue stock
without worrying about diminishing their power.”).
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protecting the outsiders from the above-mentioned scenario.213
The rule does not require firms to seek shareholder approval in the
imminence of the shares issuance, meaning that as of the time of the vote,
shareholders cannot be completely aware of the rationale of the transaction
and of its effects on the ownership structure of the firm (including the
dilution of a specific shareholder that may not be part of shareholders base
as of the time of the vote).214 This flaw is particularly critical in the noncontrolled public corporation, where the shareholders’ base may vary more
often depending on the presence of either active or engaged shareholders.
Second, in the context of controlled companies, the charter amendment does
not distinguish between issuances involving the controlling shareholder and
those where the purchasers are public shareholders not related to her.215
Indeed, a controller may easily approve the charter amendment thereby
succeeding the hypothesis described in Section III.B.i.216 For a similar
reason, the solution does not fix even the issue presented in the case CBS v.
NAI, unless the amendment process was carried out exactly just before the
proposed transaction.217
B. Shareholders’ Power Pursuant to Stock Exchange Rules
Rules that U.S. stock exchanges adopt usually require the shareholders’
approval when the equity issuance has a material impact on the voting rights
balance of the public company.218 Namely any issuance either resulting in a
change of control of the issuer or having a voting power above twenty
percent of that of the outstanding shares, triggers the shareholder vote
provision.219 This limit seems more effective than the one that the previous
Section discussed since it maintains a vote on the specific transaction. In
other words, when shareholders’ vote, they have (or at least they are
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra Part III.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 161 (2020).
See id.
See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 519 (“[M]inority shareholders in corporations
with a controlling shareholder derive little protection from this rule because majority
shareholders can consent to increase the number of authorized shares.”); see also Goshen
& Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 943 (explaining how this
protection proved to be useless in the Google recapitalization of 2012, where the
founders holding the majority of the voting rights were able to approve the issuance of a
new class of shares although they “were clearly self-interested”).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18 for a detailed discussion of the case.
218. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 180–81 (“U.S. listing
requirements require a shareholder vote when a new issue of shares is large enough to
shift voting control over a listed company . . . .”).
219. NYSE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2019); see also NASDAQ RULE
5635 (setting forth a similar provision to the NYSE rule).
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reasonably supposed to have) a clear view of both the terms of the transaction
including the price, the subscribers’ identity, and the transaction’s impact on
the ownership structure of the corporation. However, some concerns remain
from the substantive and procedural perspectives.
On the substantive side, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rule
provides for an exemption in the event of a cash offer to the public.220
Therefore, the rule limits the flexibility of management to privately sell
blocks to sympathetic investors but fails to protect outsiders should the
managers have the only goal of diluting one or several specific shareholders,
which management could accomplish with an offering to the dispersed
public investors (rather than having to act in concert with one or more
specific purchasers).221 Finally, the rule sets forth another exemption if the
firm issues shares in exchange for cash consideration at least equal to the
market price of the share.222 Therefore, this provision excludes shareholder
votes for all the cases of non-cheap share issuances: although the approach
to focus only on the exploitation of economic value might be reasonable,
since the source of the provision is a stock exchange regulation, it arguably
does not fulfill the protection of all shareholders’ interests by itself. In fact,
the same critiques concerning the application of the price fairness scrutiny
to new share issuances223 apply to this rule with a stronger magnitude given
that the market price is possibly below the fair price in a transaction
reallocating voting rights. In addition, having recently further increased the
flexibility of the issuer with regard to the minimum price, the stock market
rule is even more exposed to the critique that it fails to consider that the value
220. Note that these exemptions do not apply in the case of the issuance shifting the
control of the issuer. See JOSHUA N. KORFF ET AL., NYSE IMPROVES 20% RULE
REQUIRING SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF CERTAIN PRIVATE PLACEMENTS 2 (2019), https:
//www.kirkland.com/-/media/publications/alert/2019/02/nyse-improves-20-rulerequiring-shareholder-approv.pdf.
221. See id. at 1.
222. NYSE, supra note 219, §§ 312.03(c)(2)–312.04(i) (explaining that “shareholder
approval will not be required for any such issuance involving: any public offering for
cash; or any other financing (that is not a public offering for cash) in which the company
is selling securities for cash, if such financing involves a sale of common stock, . . . at a
price at least as great as the Minimum Price,” where the definition of Minimum Price is
“a price that is the lower of: (i) the Official Closing Price immediately preceding the
signing of the binding agreement; or (ii) the average Official Closing Price for the five
trading days immediately preceding the signing of the binding agreement”); see also
Eleazar Klein & Evan A. Berger, SEC Approves NYSE’s Amended “Related Party” and
“20%” Stockholder Approval Rules, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 20,
2021), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/04/20/sec-approves-nyses-amended-relate
d-party-and-20-stockholder-approval-rules/ (discussing a recent amendment to the rule,
which removed the “5% limit for any single purchaser participating in a transaction”).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 41–59.
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of the voting right is subjective, since the stock market rule increases the
likelihood that the shareholders’ vote is not triggered even if the issuance
price is below the diluted shareholders’ subjective value of their voting
rights.224
From a broader and procedural perspective, the rule has been recently
called into question in the context of the CBS v. NAI case, as the highly
dilutive dividend that the managers of CBS approved would have deprived
NAI of the issuer’s control.225 Given that Delaware courts did not rule on
the matter, it is not clear whether CBS’ directors relied on any exemption to
the rule or if this structure was effectively compliant.226 A post from the law
firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton argues that “the CBS-NAI situation
should serve as a reminder that stockholders should be wary of relying too
heavily on stock exchange rules as protection against potential dilutive stock
issuances.”227 The main argument is the potential lack of enforcement power
of stock exchange rules that are likely to not have the force of law.228 The
lack of shareholder power for enforcing the stock exchange rules appears to
be abstracted from a series of cases, including a recent 2005 ruling of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.229 The Cleary
Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton post further indicated that the board of directors
224. NYSE has recently amended the rule in order to eliminate the requirement for
shareholder approval in the event that the issuance price falls between the Minimum
Price and the book value of the stock. See supra note 222 (defining Minimum Price);
KORFF ET AL., supra note 220, at 1 (pointing out that the new rule enhances the flexibility
of the issuer).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18.
226. See Victor Lewkow et al., Lessons from the CBS-NAI Dispute: Can Stockholders
Rely on Stock Exchange Rules to Prevent Dilution of Their Voting and Economic
Interests?, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-an
d-insights/publication-listing/lessons-from-the-cbs-nai-dispute-can-stockholders-relyon-stock-exchange-rules-to-prevent, reprinted in Victor Lewkow et al., CBS-NAI
Dispute, Part III: Can Stockholders Rely on Stock Exchange Rules to Prevent Dilution
of Their Voting and Economic Interests?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct.
24, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/10/24/cbs-nai-dispute-part-iii-can-sto
ckholders-rely-on-stock-exchange-rules-to-prevent-dilution-of-their-voting-and-econ
omic-interests/ (suggesting firstly that the CBS issuance might have been grounded in an
NYSE statement on the twenty percent rule that affirms it “does not apply to stock
dividends and splits because they are distributions rather than transactions” and exhorts
stakeholders to focus on the actual intent of the issuance, and secondly arguing that the
NYSE statement was unlikely to be applied to dilutive dividends as the main purpose
was to focus on effective distributions). A ruling on the matter is not available since the
dispute ultimately settled. See Settlement and Release Agreement, In re CBS Corp. Litig.
(No. 20180343-AGB) (Sept. 9, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828
/000119312518269601/d622048dex10a.htm.
227. Lewkow et al., supra note 226.
228. See id.
229. Brady v. Calyon Sec. (USA), 406 F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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might be willing to take the risk of having the company delisted (the
principal sanction that the stock exchange may enact) in order to achieve
their goal.230
In conclusion, the stock exchange rules do not seem to be a reliable source
of protection for shareholders seeking to avoid a dilution of their fractional
stake. Not only do they fail to address some specific instances, but there are
issues concerning their overall enforcement. Furthermore, any decision
maker or transaction planner of the firm is likely to structure the transaction
in order to take advantage of these gaps and avoid the shareholders’ vote:231
were the voting requirement set forth by Delaware corporate law, their task
would be at least harder. Finally, this Article advocates a consistent body of
rules set forth by corporate law rather than by stock exchange regulations
and that do not discriminate based on the stock exchange where the
corporation is listed.
V. A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO THE EQUITY ISSUANCES
The analysis so far can be summarized as follows: (1) the issuance of new
shares might have a material impact not only on the corporation’s finance
but also on its governance; (2) the current ownership structure of public firms
witnesses several instances of shareholders who are concerned about the
dilution of their stake, and the entire fairness standard does not address this
problem; (3) the managers may use this tool to exploit shareholders’ value;
and (4) the current shareholders’ powers do not effectively protect them from
the managers’ exploitation. This Part seeks to propose a new legal
framework that arguably better addresses shareholders’ concerns of
enhancing their powers in the context of new equity issuances. This
normative approach arises from the comparison with the rules that, in
compliance with EU laws (when applicable), the EU countries adopt.232
230. See Lewkow et al., supra note 226 (pointing out that the firm is “aware of at least
one situation where the board of a major company seemed to be prepared to not comply
with the NYSE Policy in the context of a competitive M&A situation, after receiving
advice as to the likelihood of an NYSE enforcement action and the likelihood of other
trading markets developing in the event of a delisting” and specifying that the transaction
had not been completed for different reasons). On the point, see generally Steven
Davidoff Solomon, Warren Buffett’s Lost Vote, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 21, 2010, 9:05 AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/warren-buffetts-lost-vote/?src=tptw, for the
argument that if a company is not required to be listed, it may be willing to accept this
extreme solution.
231. See Marco Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad
Acquisitions?, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3035, 3040 (2016) (exposing relevant literature and
cases).
232. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 181 (“EU jurisdictions
have a stronger tradition of putting new share issues to the vote of shareholders, although
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Namely, as a default rule, (i) shareholder consent is required to approve the
issuance and (ii) once the transaction is approved, shareholders are entitled
to subscribe pro-rata to the newly issued shares. The remainder of this Part
is structured as follows: Section A focuses on the preemptive right provision
and points out why it fails to address the issues flagged in previous parts; and
Section B focuses on shareholders’ approval — which is arguably the most
suitable improvement — and seeks to understand the best possible
implementation in order to address the above-mentioned problems.
A. The Preemptive Right in Public Companies
The preemptive right is the right of existing shareholders to subscribe prorata to the newly issued shares.233 It is a default provision in European
countries, where it can be partially, or entirely, waived should certain
specified exemptions be met.
Supporters of the preemptive right claim its effectiveness in protecting
outsider shareholders from dilution by the decision makers of the new equity
issuances, either the controllers or the managers depending on the
circumstances. While the provision is undoubtedly a useful tool from the
perspective of the firm’s majority shareholder, who is able to retain her
fractional economic and voting power within the firm, the majoritarian view
addresses the provision as a minority’s tool in the context of the conflict
against the majority.234 Arguably, the controller is supposed to find
protection from any dilution in the dominant (i.e., controlling) influence that
she can exercise over the managers.235
Looking at the function of the provision, some scholars claim that the main
purpose is to prevent the exploitation of minority shareholders’ economic
value.236 Namely, it has been indicated that, should the issuance of shares be
the company’s charter or the shareholders in general meeting may delegate that decision
to the board, for periods of up to five years.”). See generally Ventoruzzo, supra note 22
(providing a comparative analysis between corporate laws and specifically new share
issuances in Europe and the United States).
233. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 83.
234. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 182 (pointing out how
“[p]reemptive rights are a paradigmatic example of the sharing strategy” as a way to
protect minority shareholders).
235. See GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 134 (noting that a controller who is not willing
to be diluted is presumed to block the issuance).
236. See Amal Abu Awwad, Diritti di Opzione nelle Società Quotate e Non Quotate
e Metodi di Protezione [Shareholders’ Preemptive Rights in Listed and Closely-Held
Corporations and Shareholders’ Protection Methods], 11 NUOVO DIRITTO DELLE
SOCIETÀ [NEW CORP. L.] 142, 144, 157 (2013) (It.) (pointing out that for public
corporations, market liquidity might be a suitable replacement of preemptive rights since
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underpriced, the outsiders have the option to purchase a proportional fraction
of the new equity and therefore offset the decline in their existing stake’s
value with the gain they capture in the purchase of underpriced new shares.237
Transfer of value occurs only should the existing shareholders fail to
completely exercise their respective preemptive rights.
However, other scholars pointed out how the preemptive right enables the
existing shareholders to retain their fractional voting power.238 Reasonably,
both explanations are correct and retaining the same proportional stake is a
way to avoid economic dilution.239 Since preemptive rights fulfill both
protections, wondering about the main function of the provision may seem a
speculative and pointless exercise; however, it is critical to assess the
provision’s efficiency and effectiveness, as well as whether its goal could be
better achieved otherwise. To this extent, the preemptive right indirectly
leads the corporation to keep the same ownership structure, and it has been
pointed out that this interest is perceived as compelling mainly in closed
corporations.240 Although the restatement of the preemptive right as a default
provision in the issuance of new shares does not seem to be the best solution
to address the issue of shareholder dilution, this Article disagrees with this
statement and claims that outsider shareholders of public corporations do
have some interests in limiting the discretion of the managers in diluting
shares.241
The provision also encourages a dialogue between managers and
shareholders in that the latter have to approve of any waiver of the
preemptive right.242 Arguably, the magnitude of the argument on the
engagement between insiders and outsiders depends on the strictness of the
requirements that the applicable law maintains in order to waive the
any diluted shareholder is able to purchase additional shares on the market); see also
Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra note 153, at
83 (suggesting that the feature enabling shareholders to retain the same fraction in the
ownership structure of the firm is an indirect protection).
237. See Holderness & Pontiff, supra note 29, at 253.
238. See MYNERS, supra note 60, at 10–11.
239. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 182 (“[P]reemptive
rights permit minority shareholders to safeguard their proportionate investment stakes
and discourage controlling shareholders from acquiring additional shares from the firm
at low prices.”).
240. See Abu Awwad, supra note 236, at 149 (arguing that mainly shareholders of
family-owned companies have this concern).
241. See supra Part II.
242. See FERRAN & HO, supra note 32, at 106; Eilís Ferran, Legal Capital Rules and
Modern Securities Market — the Case for Reform, as Illustrated by Equity Markets, in
CAPITAL MARKETS AND COMPANY LAW 115, 121–22 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch
eds., 2003).
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shareholders’ preemptive rights.
Differing from EU jurisdictions, the U.S. legal framework does not
empower existing shareholders with preemptive rights, which are only an
opt-in option243 and are rarely implemented into corporate charters.244
Namely, the preemptive right quickly and unsuccessfully appeared in the
United States and its importance started to decline around the second half of
the twentieth century.245 Nowadays, the main mechanism for shareholder
protection lies in the application of directors’ fiduciary duties to new share
issuances.246 In the relatively few cases where the issuers decide to provide
existing shareholders with preemptive rights in a specific issuance, the
transaction is structured as a rights offering.247 This historical evolution may
be a reason not to argue for the implementation of preemptive rights in the
United States; however, it is not the only argument.
An additional argument lies in the provision’s function to protect outsider
shareholders from underpriced issuances. The approach that this Article
seeks to suggest concerns the economic side of the transaction and advocates
the enhancement of shareholder protections from economic dilution through
the improvement of the overall process of new share issuances. This seems
to be the established trend in Delaware law with regard to different corporate
law transactions entered into by public corporations.248 In fact, the legal
approach that Delaware courts repeatedly adopt is to assess the fairness of
the price to the minority shareholders in controlled transactions through the
quality of the process.249 The argument is to extend the attitude that was
243. See Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 182; cf. Abu Awwad,
supra note 236, at 156–57 (suggesting that the policies of the United States and European
countries are converging with regard to the use of preemptive rights in public
corporations).
244. See CLARK, supra note 37, § 17.1.4.
245. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 520–21.
246. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 84.
247. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 353; see also Massa et al., supra note 30, at 6, 13 (describing the procedure
of a rights offer).
248. See generally Guhan Subramanian, Appraisal after Dell, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 222 (Steven Davidoff
Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., 2019) (arguing that in the context of appraisal
proceedings, the deal price should receive a material presumption of fairness if the courts
find the deal process to have been at arm’s length).
249. See id. at 236 (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court converted a substantive inquiry
(Was the deal price entirely fair to the minority shareholders?) into a procedural inquiry
(Did the minority shareholders have adequate procedural protections?).”). Subramanian
mentioned the case Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. as a paradigmatic example of his
statement. Id. (citing Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A3d 635 (Del. 2014)).
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endorsed in the context of freeze-out transactions and appraisal proceedings
to the equity issuances, which to an extent are comparable cases because the
broad purpose of corporate law in such instances is to protect outsider
shareholders from possible abuses of managers through the transaction.
On this side, the preemptive right fails to enhance the quality of the
process, as well as the fairness of the price. Contrarily, the cornerstone of
the provision is that, should the issuance price be below the fair market value
of the shares, the loss that existing shareholders incur is offset by the right to
purchase pro-rata new shares at a price that is advantageous from the
purchaser’s perspective.250 Alternatively, the existing shareholders may sell
their preemptive right. In sum, the incentive to focus on the quality of the
process is arguably undermined by the purported lack of interest in the
existing shareholders that may recover the unfairness of the price through
subscription rights. On that point, financial studies noted that, customarily,
rights offers provide “a 10-15% discount from the stock’s current market
price.”251 The preemptive right is an ex-post remedy (with the weaknesses
that authoritative scholars pointed out and this Section has exposed) to limit
the negative impacts of a flawed process, rather than a tool to improve the
quality of the process itself.
To this extent, a further critique of the provision is its necessary reliance
on the efficient functioning of the financial markets. Namely, as above
mentioned, the provision’s main purpose is to protect outsiders from
economic exploitation and this purpose is only achieved if there is a full
exercise of the rights, should the offer be underpriced. Therefore, the
provision is flawed for those shareholders whose financial or other
constraints prevent them from exercising their rights.252 The traditional
solution lies in a shareholder’s ability to sell the right to another investor;253
should the rights market be not sufficiently liquid or non-tradable, the
recommended approach for existing shareholders is to exercise the right and
sell the share immediately after the purchase254 or to sell the shares before
250. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 22, at 520 (explaining that the traditional approach
in the United States was to grant shareholders the right to purchase pro-rata any new
shares issued).
251. B. Espen Eckbo, Equity Issues and the Disappearing Rights Offer Phenomenon,
20 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 72, 72 (2008).
252. See GEVURTZ, supra note 35, at 135 (pointing out the flaws of preemptive rights
in protecting a shareholder “who lacks either the funds or the willingness to take
advantage of the right by purchasing more shares”).
253. But see Massa et al., supra note 30, at 2 (indicating the problematic side of this
alternative in that shareholders who fail to communicate their preference between
subscribing and selling incur a loss).
254. Holderness & Pontiff, supra note 29, at 261.
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the distribution of the right. In each case, the protection of the investor is
shifted to financial markets: a recent financial study suggested that if the
right is non-tradable, shareholders often seek to sell their shares before
receiving the right (if they do not plan on exercising it).255 The resulting
pressure to sell, therefore, undermines the value of the right.
In addition, the preemptive right fails to fulfill the protection of certain
shareholder interests pointed out in previous Parts256 because it concerns
both non-controlled and controlled corporations. To begin with, the
preemptive right forces the outsiders to choose between being diluted and
increasing their overall investment in the firm.257 This is a critical concern,
particularly for embedded shareholders who cannot increase their economic
exposure in the firm, and institutional investors or hedge funds that may not
want to increase their exposure in the firm by investing too many
resources.258
In addition, the fact that the outsider shareholders subscribe to the new
shares does not imply, by itself, that they are not being exploited for
economic value.259 Namely, as mentioned, the controller may have an
interest in the firm issuing shares that are either absolutely overpriced —
with the controller voluntarily refraining from the purchase of the new shares
— or relatively overpriced, meaning that the insider seeks to extract private
benefits from the firm and this makes the purchase of new shares convenient
for her at a price above their fair market value.260 The preemptive right fails
to address the shareholders’ concerns in all cases where the issuance is not
underpriced, since it grants the outsider shareholders the right to purchase
the new shares at a disadvantageous price. The facts of the above-mentioned
OTK v. Friedman case are aligned with this argument.261
Recent studies indicated that the lack of adequate information undermines
the effectiveness of the preemptive right in protecting the minority

255. Wai-Ming Fong & Kevin C.K. Lam, Rights Offerings and Expropriation by
Controlling Shareholders, 41 J. BUS. FIN. ACCT. 773, 776 (2014) (hypothesizing a
relation between the agency issue and the number of non-exercised rights).
256. See supra Section II.C.
257. See FERRAN & HO, supra note 32, at 124 (pointing out the coercive effect of the
preemptive right provision, especially in the event of an underpriced offer, which often
occurs with preemptive rights).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 145–47.
259. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 86 (pointing out both the cases of overpriced-issuance tunneling and
minorities’ fear of overpriced-issuance tunneling).
260. See supra Section III.B.i.b.
261. See supra Section III.B.i.b.
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shareholders from cheap-stock tunneling.262 Namely, the information
asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders — which enhances the
disclosure rules that apply in the context of public companies —263 prevents
the outsiders from assessing whether the issuance price falls below or above
the fair price of the issuer’s shares. On that point, a recent empirical study
involving the Hong Kong stock market found that agency concerns may
prevent the shareholders from exercising their rights while, if the issuance
was underpriced, the controllers, who often act as underwriters, strengthen
their position at a deep discount.264
Were the shareholders fully informed, the preemptive right would be a
more useful provision to avoid the cheap-stock tunneling, but this scenario
is unrealistic in practice.265 In the context of public companies, not even
tradable rights are effective in solving the issue, since the purchaser of the
right faces the same lack of information as the outsider shareholders.266 A
recent proposal claims that in the context of a right offering, the insiders’
decision on the subscription is material information for the outsiders and
suggests that outsiders should be allowed to condition the exercise of their
rights on the insiders’ decision.267 However, the case of the relatively
underpriced issuance undermines this solution, since the fact that an exercise
price is convenient for the insider does not, by itself, make it convenient for
the outsiders.
This flaw undermines the effectiveness of the provision not only in
protecting the outsiders from cheap-stock tunneling and overpriced-stock
tunneling but also in avoiding the decline in their voting power through the
exercise of subscription rights. The fact that a given outsider shareholder
has an incentive to retain her voting power does not necessarily mean that
she is willing to overpay for the newly issued shares — or to incur such risk,

262. See Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra
note 153, at 86. See generally Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around
Preemptive Rights, supra note 95 (discussing the pros and cons of preemptive rights in
defending all shareholders from cheap-stock tunneling).
263. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 363.
264. Fong & Lam, supra note 255, at 787.
265. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 363.
266. Fried, Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure, supra note
153, at 93.
267. See Mira Ganor, The Case for Non-Binary, Contingent, Shareholder Action 3,
23 (Feb. 2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Ganor, The Case for NonBinary, Contingent, Shareholder Action], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=3530596.
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since she does not know the range in which the price falls268 — to achieve
the goal. Therefore, building on these studies, it seems reasonable to argue
that the information asymmetry is likely to frustrate the preemptive right’s
avoidance of voting dilution.
This analysis is consistent with the finding of a recent study, which
focused on the impact of the announcement that a public firm has approved
a new share issuance over the market price of the already traded shares of
that issuer. The overall impact of new equity issuances is usually negative,
and structuring the transaction as a rights offering does not change the
outcome by itself. In other words, granting preemptive rights to existing
shareholders does not result, by itself, in a positive effect on the shares’ price,
contrarily to what happens should the issuance be approved by the
shareholders.269
B. The Proposal for Reform: Shareholders’ Vote
The Italian experience may serve as a proper introduction to this normative
Section. Italian law, pursuant to European rules, requires shareholders to
vote on issuing new shares. Although, for reputational reasons, the board
reasonably tends to engage with the major shareholders and secure consent
ahead of proposing the resolution, there are two recent cases of shareholders
that successfully opposed an increase in the number of outstanding voting
shares.
In June of 2015, the French company Vivendi S.A. acquired a stake of
14.9 percent in Telecom Italia S.p.A. and, by December of 2015, had become
its major shareholder with participation equal to 20.116 percent of the voting
rights.270 As of December of 2015, Telecom Italia S.p.A. had issued
13,499,911,771 share of common stock and 6,027,791,699 shares of nonvoting stock.271 At the shareholders’ meeting on December 15, 2015, the
268. Specifically, the outsider shareholder does not know whether the newly issued
shares are underpriced, relatively underpriced from the perspective of the controller, or
absolutely overpriced.
269. See Holderness, supra note 107, at 427 (noting that “[w]hen there is no
shareholder approval, average returns are typically negative and are sometimes large,”
but the announcement of a shareholder-approved right offering positively affects the
stock price).
270. TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A, EXPLANATORY REPORT BY VIVENDI S.A. TO TELECOM
ITALIA S.P.A. SHAREHOLDERS 1 (2015), https://www.gruppotim.it/content/dam/telecom
italia/en/archive/documents/investors/AGM_and_Meetings/2015/Explanatory-reportVivendi-bis.pdf.
271. TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A, MEETING MINUTES OF TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A.
ORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING 1 (2015), https://www.gruppotim.it/content/dam/
telecomitalia/en/archive/documents/investors/AGM_and_Meetings/2015/minutesordinary-shareholders-meeting-15-dic-2015.pdf.
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board of directors of Telecom proposed an extraordinary resolution to
convert each non-voting stock into one common stock.272 If the shareholders
had approved the transaction, the conversion would have diluted the voting
rights of the common shareholders by 31.1 percent,273 resulting in a dilution
of Vivendi’s stake below fourteen percent of the voting rights. Due to
Vivendi’s opposition — which in the same context successfully also
achieved the appointment of four directors — the board’s resolution failed
to reach the necessary threshold to be adopted, and the number of issued
common stock was not increased.274 Notably, the proposed transaction was
not technically an issuance of new shares for consideration but a
recapitalization still aimed at significantly increasing the number of voting
stock. Furthermore, this conversion would have prevented the shareholders
from exercising preemptive rights that they are usually granted in equity
issuances in Europe.
In December of 2018, the board of directors of Banca Carige S.p.A.
proposed at the shareholder meeting to adopt a resolution empowering the
directors to issue new shares in exchange for an amount equal to or up to
€400 million.275 According to the proposal, the board would have eventually
determined the terms (including the number of new shares) of the
transaction,276 and existing shareholders would have been granted
preemptive rights.277 The proposal failed to meet the required votes even if
272. Press Release, Telecom Italia, Telecom Italia Shareholders’ Meeting Held (Dec.
15, 2015), https://www.gruppotim.it/content/dam/telecomitalia/en/archive/documents/
media/Press_releases/telecom_italia/Corporate/Financial/2015/PR-AGM-15-12-15.pdf.
273. TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A., EXPLANATORY REPORT OF EXTRAORDINARY GENERAL
SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING TO SHAREHOLDERS 12 (2015), https://www.telecomitalia.com
/content/dam/telecomitalia/en/archive/documents/investors/AGM_and_Meetings/2015/
English-Translation-of-directors-explanatory-report-EGM-151115.pdf. Note that the
transaction, if approved, had a voluntary conversion and a mandatory conversion: since
the first one had a more convenient term for the holders of non-voting shares, it is fair to
assume that all the holders would have picked the voluntary option.
274. TELECOM ITALIA S.P.A., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE VOTES OF SHAREHOLDERS’
MEETING 1 (2015), https://www.telecomitalia.com/content/dam/telecomitalia/en/archive
/documents/investors/AGM_and_Meetings/2015/summary-report-of-the-shareholdersmeeting-votes-15-12-2015.pdf; see Gaia Balp, Activist Shareholders at De Facto
Controlled Companies, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341, 365–66 (2019).
275. BANCA CARIGE, BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ REPORT OF THE THIRD ITEM ON THE
AGENDA OF THE EXTRAORDINARY SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING 1 (2018), https://www.
gruppocarige.it/grpwps/wcm/connect/265f54ba-ee55-41f7-9638-9bdb9d302435/
03+Relazione+CdA+aumento+di+capitale_ENG+con+commenti+per+Legali+e+AS.p
df?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-265f54ba-ee55-41f7-96389bdb9d302435-mvMmw4h.
276. See id. at 1, 3 (citing Section 2443 of the Italian Civil Code, which expressly sets
forth this alternative).
277. See id. at 9.
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it did not undermine the shareholders’ right to avoid dilution of their stake;
therefore, the transaction was not completed.278 Arguably the lack of
approval of the issuer’s major shareholder — carrying 27.5 percent of the
voting rights — played a critical role.279
Taking advantage of the comparative experience, this Section seeks to put
up a new legal framework aimed at addressing the corporate governance
issues280 that may arise in the context of the transaction, either in controlled
or non-controlled public firms.
This Article applies Professor Bebchuk’s argument that managers “should
not have control over ‘constitutional’ decisions that affect the basic corporate
governance arrangements to which the company is subject” to the
transaction.281 The proposed change lies in the allocation of powers between
shareholders and managers and seeks to empower the former with a property
rule protection. Therefore, shareholders may not be expropriated of their
voting rights without their approval, notwithstanding the transaction’s
fairness.282 Namely, the new rule requires the fully informed and uncoerced
shareholders’ vote to complete the transaction. While the raising of
additional equity capital –— as well as the distribution — is a business
decision, its potentially strong impact on the ownership structure of the firm

278. BANCA CARIGE, ASSEMBLEA ORDINARIA DEGLI AZIONISTI TENUTASI [ORDINARY
SHAREHOLDERS’ MEETING] 2 (2018), https://www.gruppocarige.it/grpwps/wcm/connect
/b035d1ca-239a-44e7-9699-7561ac1c34ad/Elenco+Votazioni.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=ROOTWORKSPACE-b035d1ca-239a-44e7-9699-7561ac1c34ad-mvM
mvbg (showing that despite the fact that more individual shareholders voted in favor of
the proposal, the shareholders who abstained from voting held a larger percentage of the
voting shares).
279. Raoul de Forcade, Carige, Malacalza Si Astiene: Salta L’Aumento di Capitale
da 400 Milioni [Carige, Malacalza Abstains: 400 Million Increase in Capital Falls
Through], IL SOLE 24 ORE (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/carige-mal
acalza-si-astiene-salta-l-aumento-capitale-400-milioni-AEDylR4G (noting the impact of
the abstention by a major shareholder, Malacalza Investments, on the ultimate fate of the
proposal).
280. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13, 14) (claiming for a “distinctive
treatment” of transactions that can potentially affect the governance of the firm).
281. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 75, at 837.
Note that while the Author develops this argument in a paper about public firms with
dispersed ownership, the following Sections extend its application to the case of
controlled firms, thereby seeking to limit the autonomy of the managers both when they
act in conjunction with the controller or against her will.
282. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 601 (explaining that under property rules, “minority shareholders or courts

cannot unilaterally take control rights away from the controller even for objectively
fair compensation”). Notably, although Goshen and Hamdani addressed the rule from
the perspective of the controlling shareholders, its features are the same both in
controlled and non-controlled firms.
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positions it as a fundamental corporate governance change.283 Under the
current legal framework, the assumption underlying the lack of shareholder
approval for a new share issuance is that it does not fall within the
corporation’s fundamental changes unless it crosses the limit of the number
of the firm’s authorized shares by the charter of incorporation (as this
specific case triggers the requirement of the shareholders’ vote).284
However, since this threshold is arbitrarily settled by the charter of
incorporation and is usually very large,285 it does not seem to be a good
benchmark to capture the materiality of the change. For the same reasons, it
should not be argued that the shareholders had in advance approved the
transaction as of the time of the charter’s amendment. A recent article points
out the downsides of an allocation of power that entrusts the managers with
decisions that may materially change the governance of a public firm:286 in
fact, this effect may be achieved even without having to increase the number
of authorized shares. Another study extensively analyzed the allocation of
power in the context of new shares issuances and found that “the power to
issue stock in its current format enables managers to circumvent the will of
the shareholders and promote the managers’ own self-interest at the
shareholders’ expense.”287 Accordingly, the strategic selective distributions
of the new shares (and therefore of newly created votes) to a board-friendly
shareholder might substantially accomplish the same goal as the direct
purchase of votes.288
CBS v. NAI differs from the other cases that this Article discussed in that
the diluted shareholder was able to block the transaction.289 In fact, the order
endorsed the principle that the controlling shareholder is entitled to react to

283. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 19) (“When a company distributes a newly
created class of stock as a dividend, while the problems tend to be somewhat different,
concerns over governance changes can nevertheless arise.”). Notably, Min’s paper
applies this reasoning to all new share issuances regardless of whether they are structured
as a distribution or not.
284. See Kim & Min, supra note 158, at 4 (pointing out a similar argument with regard
to spin-off transactions, i.e., “[a]n important assumption for such lack of shareholder
approval in a spin-off is that there are no fundamental changes to shareholder rights
before and after the spin-off”).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 207–17 (discussing the other limits of the
rule).
286. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 24) (“As the CBS case demonstrates,
directors’ power to declare a stock dividend, if unchecked, confers significant power to
the board and management to impact a company’s governance structure.”).
287. Ganor, The Power to Issue Stock, supra note 25, at 707.
288. See id. at 733.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 14–18.
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the managers’ action diluting her voting power.290 However, as previous
parts pointed out, the controlling shareholders may not be the only parties
concerned with dilution and interested in opposing the managers of a public
firm. While the case shows that the controllers — even when they lack
control over the board of directors in the context of the transaction — are
usually empowered with some instruments to neutralize the management’s
action and prevent the dilution of her participation, the other more or less
significant but non-controlling shareholders lack any instruments. Arguably,
the loss of a portion of voting rights is not considered an expropriation,
dissimilar from what occurs with the loss of control.
This Article claims that any voting rights dilution may prove to be an issue
even if it does not shift the control of the firm and seeks to extend its scope
to any equity issuances regardless of the presence of a controlling
shareholder.291 The ultimate goal of the proposal is to enhance the protection
of the outsiders from the dilution that the insiders — whoever they are
depending on the circumstances: controlling shareholders, managers or
directors — may seek. It advocates a consistent framework granting the
shareholders relatively homogenous powers (i.e., proportional to the fraction
of voting shares they own) and tailored to the specific issuance. Mirroring
the structure of previous sections,292 the rule may deem even the controller
to be an outsider, depending on the degree of influence that she exercises
over the corporation’s decision maker with regard to the specific issuance.
Arguably, this suggested approach also improves the issuance process, in
that it favors a constructive dialogue between shareholders and managers
since in the large majority of cases, the insiders have a strong incentive to
seek the approval of the outsiders.293 On that point, reputational arguments
make managers more careful to avoid submitting unfair proposals (or at least
unfair to the majority of those entitled to vote) to the shareholders’ vote,
facing the risk of having the proposal rejected. The requirement of a
shareholder vote on the transaction — and an increasingly intense interaction
with the management — appears to be strictly connected to the sophistication
of the shareholder base.294 Although it might be argued that the customary
290. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385,
at *6 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). Note that a definitive ruling on the item is not available
since the dispute subsequently settled. See generally Settlement and Release Agreement,
supra note 226 (detailing the settlement between the two parties).
291. See text accompanying notes 55–58.
292. See supra Section III.B.ii.
293. See Kim & Min, supra note 158, at 49–50 (pointing out the advantages of exante shareholder approval in the context of spin-offs).
294. See Holderness, supra note 107, at 437 (wondering whether mandatory
shareholder approval and the resulting increased engagement between shareholders and
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retail shareholder lacks the financial resources to cast an informed vote and
therefore finds it a burdensome task,295 the previous Parts embrace a different
view.296 On that point, an authoritative work exposed the transformation of
U.S. capital markets and claimed that the transformation resulted in a shift
of control over corporate affairs from courts to markets:297 accordingly, “the
increased deference of the Delaware courts to market actors reflects the
Delaware courts’ correct understanding that sophisticated shareholders are
better positioned to adjudge the merits of board decisions and to discipline
disloyalty and incompetence.”298 To this extent, not only the sophisticated
shareholders may properly vote on the transaction, but also they need this
right to avoid an unduly dilution and carry out such monitoring activity,
which now may take place ahead of the transaction rather than through
subsequent litigation. In fact, the proposal is consistent with the expectations
that the institutional shareholders shared: indeed, BlackRock has recently
advocated for the requirement of shareholders’ approval in the context of
new share issuances.299
Finally, the proposal is consistent with the thesis of a study that analyzed
the new issuance in several countries from the stock-price perspective and
found an overall positive effect of the announcement of a shareholderapproved issuance on the market price of the firm’s shares.300 Accordingly,
a reasonable explanation of the outcome lies in agency tensions that usually
affect the issuance since, should only the managers approve the transaction,

managers would make the shareholder base more sophisticated).
295. Ganor, The Case for Non-Binary, Contingent, Shareholder Action, supra note
267 (manuscript at 2).
296. See supra Section II.C.
297. See Goshen & Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, supra note 79, at 265.
298. Id. at 289.
299. See Barbara Novick, Open Letter Regarding Consultation on the Treatment of
Unequal Voting Structures in the MSCI Equity Indexes, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (May 3, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/03/open-letter-re
garding-consultation-on-the-treatment-of-unequal-voting-structures-in-the-msci-equityindexes/ (“[S]hareholders should be able to vote on matters that are material to the
protection of their investment including but not limited to changes to the purpose of the
business, matters related to capital issuance such as dilution levels and preemptive rights,
the distribution of income and the capital structure.”).
300. See Holderness, supra note 107, at 425 (exposing the findings of an analysis
carried out on public firms without differentiating the concentration of the ownership
structure). Note that while a market-oriented critique of the proposed rule might argue
that if it were a material improvement, the market would have already implemented it,
these empirical outcomes might offer an adequate response. Namely, the positive market
reaction to shareholder-approved issuances should be read as an implied incentive to add
this feature in order to benefit from a better stock performance.
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the investors perceive them as possibly perpetrating self-interests.301
Arguably, the framework should be declined in different ways depending
on the structure of the transaction and the identity of the subscribers in order
to properly address the relevant conflicts and risks of exploitation. In
addition to the general features of the shareholder vote — arguably
applicable to each case — the remainder of this Part seeks to focus on the
different scenarios, explaining how the rule should be implemented and
positioning it in the current case law and literature. Mirroring the distinction
that Part III drew, Section V.B.i focuses on the case of dispersed public
corporations, while Section V.B.ii focuses on the case of firms with a
controlling shareholder.
i. The Rule for Non-Controlled Corporations
In a corporation where control is contested,302 the transaction would
require the approval of a plain majority of the shareholders. Professor
Bebchuk’s seminal work strongly advocates an overall increase in
shareholders’ powers in dispersed public companies and repeatedly labels
certain changes in the category of the “rules-of-the-game,”303 which
“concern[s] the choice of the rules by which corporate actors play.”304 These
rules mainly include amendments to the corporate charter and the state of
incorporation of the firm and “generally require a vote of shareholder
approval” on the managers’ proposals.305 While Professor Bebchuk argues
for empowering shareholders to propose and adopt rule-of-the-game
decisions, this Article suggests broadening the “rule-of-the-game” definition
to encompass the issuance of new shares, regardless of whether it requires
an amendment to the charter of incorporation (i.e., exceeds the number of
authorized shares). Although the rule generally limits the abuse of power by
managers, it has a stronger impact on strategic issuances.
Namely, assuming that the managers seek to dilute a specific engaged or
active shareholder, with the current allocation of powers, they may achieve
the goal of preventing the shareholders from expressing their dissent.306
Contrarily, under the proposed framework, although the to-be-diluted
301. Id. at 434 (finding that if the shareholder vote is intense and close to the issuance,
the positive impact of the announcement over the stock price is further strengthened and
pointing out that the structure of the issuance is irrelevant).
302. See supra Section II.A (analyzing shareholder-manager conflict in this context).
303. See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note
75 (suggesting that shareholder intervention power can be grouped into two categories:
“rules-of-the-game decisions” and “specific business decisions”).
304. Id. at 844.
305. Id. at 837.
306. See supra Section III.A.
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shareholder would obviously not have the voting power to veto the issuance
by herself, the shareholder class would be entitled to choose between the
agenda of the shareholder and the managers when casting the vote. The vote
on the transaction de facto moves forward on the agenda and, in the context
of an activist campaign, the proxy contest. Therefore, in the event of the
action of an activist hedge fund, the other shareholders could vote on her
dilution by the managers, taking a position in favor of or against her interests.
The scenario fits with the facts of Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, where
institutional shareholders joined the activist in the dispute.307 Under the
proposed scenario, they would have voted on the dilution of the plaintiff
before it could be completed. The proposed rule increases the shareholders’
powers in equity issuances and is likely to protect long-term shareholders’
engagement, reducing the power of the managers to frustrate their activity.308
Finally, comparing the shareholder vote with preemptive rights, the
proposal shares the feature of encouraging interaction between the managers
and shareholders before a vote, given the former’s incentives to propose a
structure that is approved when it fulfills shareholders’ expectations.
However, the proposal does not condition protection on further economic
investment in the firm309 and seems to be a more flexible tool from the
perspective of the managers. In fact, there are instances where managers
may legitimately believe that broadening the ownership base of the firm
fulfills the corporation’s interest. In order to pursue this goal under the
proposed rule, the managers would need the approval of the majority of
shareholders with voting rights, while when the mandatory preemptive right
applies, all the entitled shareholders will subscribe pro-rata.310
ii. The Rule for Controlled Corporations
Mirroring the analysis that Part III carried out, the application of the
proposed rule is two-fold, depending on the participation of the controller in
the transaction. As a general approach, the rule complies with the traditional
mission of corporate law to protect the outsider shareholders from agency
costs311 without undermining the controllers’ position. Namely, depending
307.
308.
309.
310.

See supra text accompanying notes 134–39.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Part IV (acknowledging this downside of the preemptive right).
Even if we assume that under certain circumstances the preemptive right could
be waived, the majority’s approval of the voting rights on the preemptive right would be
insufficient by itself to achieve the goal. Otherwise, if the consent of the majority of the
votes was sufficient to waive the preemptive right, one of the main alleged upsides of the
provision (i.e., the protection of the minority shareholders) would be frustrated.
311. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 595.
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on the circumstances, the controlling shareholder may be considered an
outsider for the purpose of the transaction, and therefore granted a property
rule protection. In fact, the criterion that positions the controlling
shareholder in the group of outsiders or that of the insiders, is the percentage
of the new shares that she subscribes to: she falls in the management group
if she participates more than pro-rata to the new equity issuances and within
the outsiders in the opposite scenario. The solution — which relies on the
presumption that should the controller purchase more than her ratable shares,
she has a strong influence over such decision312 — is consistent with the
general approach of corporate law in similar circumstances313 and avoids
disputes on whether the transaction falls in one category or the other by
setting an objective quantitative threshold (i.e., the percentage of shares that
the controller subscribes).314 Section V.B.ii.a focuses on the case of the
controller subscribing more than pro-rata to the newly issued shares, while
Section V.B.ii.b focuses on a different scenario where the shareholder either
retains her fractional voting power or the managers dilute it.
a. The Case of the Subscribing Controller
In this scenario, the managers negotiate with the controller (or the
controller-manager is issuing shares to herself) for a transaction that
strengthens her voting power in the firm, since she purchases the new shares
more than pro-rata. Within the group of the controlling shareholders, this
Section positions the case of a quasi-controller seeking to achieve control of
the firm through more than pro-rata participation in the equity issuance. As
explained above,315 in order to assess the existence of a (either de jure or de
facto) controller — and therefore adopt the appropriate protections for the
312. Note the distinction between cases of, respectively, the subscribing controller
and the non-subscribing controller. This is only aimed at declining different voting
mechanisms with regard to the approval of a new share issuance and claiming that even
a controller may be an outsider if she does not exercise any influence on the decision
makers of the firm. Contrarily, this is not to suggest that the controlling shareholder
should not be considered as such if the managers seek her dilution or to take a position
on the debate concerning whether the control-assessment should focus on the single
transaction or on the day-to-day management of the firm. See Lipton, supra note 156, at
1994 (“[D]espite the abundance of case law — decided both before and after Corwin —
treating control over day-to-day management as a factor to be considered in the controller
analysis, the Corwin court cast that aspect of the arrangement aside.”).
313. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 27–28) (advocating a new definition of
pro-rata distributions entailing a breakdown between business and governance
decisions).
314. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 944
(mentioning the Google case to point out the lack of a quantitative criterion to assess
whether a disputed transaction is self-dealing).
315. See supra text accompanying notes 184–88.
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diluted shareholders — the focus should be on the ownership structure of the
firm after new share issuances. As indicated,316 the controller might seek to
exploit minority shareholders not only through the cheap-stock tunneling but
also by issuing non-underpriced shares that reinforce her position and
possibly result in midstream changes to the corporation’s governance.317
Either case claims for a protection of the rights of the minority shareholders,
who do not share the benefit of the transaction with the controller and whose
stakes are diluted. The traditional dichotomy in this context is between
empowering the controller to reallocate the voting rights — protecting the
outsiders with the entire fairness standard that the courts carry out after the
completion of the transaction — or the minority shareholders to block the
transaction, requiring the ex-ante approval of the majority of the minority
shareholders (“MoM”) to complete it.318
As of now, Delaware courts adopt either of the two approaches, depending
on the choice of the controller-manager, and the controller-manager has the
burden to prove that the transaction is entirely fair unless she has obtained
the MoM.319 From the perspective of minority shareholders, this system
carries the same weaknesses and flaws of the plain entire fairness standard320
since the controller, in the least favorable scenario that did not want to seek
or was not able to achieve the MoM, may always return to judicial review:
therefore, this framework is known as “voluntary MoM.”321 Among other
things, it fails to consider that the value of voting rights is highly subjective.
The application of the mandatory shareholder voting rule seeks to exclude
the vote of the controlling shareholders, therefore making the MoM a
requirement to complete the transaction. This would have had a significant
impact on several cases analyzed in Part I.322 In Reith v. Lichtestein, the
Delaware Court of Chancery applied the entire fairness standard to the
316. See supra Section III.B.i.b.
317. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note

21, at 608 (“Controlling shareholders could theoretically enjoy more than their pro rata
share of the business by using their control to change the firm’s governance arrangements
midstream either directly through changes in the charter and/or bylaws or indirectly
through some business combination, such as a merger.”).
318. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 963–
66 (providing a detailed analysis of the upsides and downsides of each approach).
319. See id. at 950; Lipton, supra note 156, at 2005–06 (defining the procedure as
“cleansing mechanisms” and describing the relationship between the shareholder vote
and the presence of independent directors).
320. See supra text accompanying notes 41–59.
321. Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 978
(“Delaware doctrine does not require controllers to subject a self-dealing transaction to
a vote by minority shareholders.”).
322. See supra text accompanying notes 1–13.
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issuance of the convertible preferred stocks and stated that the defendant had
failed to prove it, notwithstanding a 31.5 percent premium over the shares’
market price.323 However, this did not prevent the controller from
completing the transaction, with the only concern being subject to the entire
fairness standard. Contrarily, under the proposed property rule, the minority
shareholders would have been willing to block the issuance rather than being
mere witnesses to the managers’ negotiation of a transaction that granted the
controller the absolute majority of the voting rights. In a similar way, the
outsiders could have blocked the transaction in Klein v. HIG Capital, which
was also eventually subject to an entire fairness judgment.324 Arguably,
Corwin v. British American Tobacco makes the argument even stronger.325
Although the majority opinion of the court found British American not to be
the controlling shareholder on the basis that it “could not and did not exercise
actual control over the Reynolds [(the issuer)] board”326 — therefore
possibly undermining the application of the MoM under the proposal —
strengthening the odds of a different outcome. In fact, the proposed rule
strongly favors an assessment of a single transaction, considering the
quantitative criterion of the percentage of the purchased shares. A forty-two
percent shareholder who is the only purchaser of the new stocks and whose
consideration is below the public closing price of the shares the day before
the signing would be likely to be deemed a controller for the purpose of the
transaction, therefore making the issuance subject to the vote of the diluted
shareholders only.327
In addition to the already mentioned upside of the shareholder vote in
general share issuances, recent studies demonstrate the benefits of minority
shareholder approval in the specific context of transactions with controlling
shareholders.328 Building on this, another work has considered a similar
solution, as a countermeasure to the cheap-stock tunneling.329 An
international empirical study examined the effects of the announcement of
323. Reith v. Lichtenstein, No. 2018-0277-MTZ, 2019 WL 2714065, at *20 (Del. Ch.
June 28, 2019).
324. Klein v. H.I.G. Cap., L.L.C., No. 2017-0862-AGB, 2018 WL 6719717, at *15
(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2018).
325. See Corwin v. Brit. Am. Tobacco PLC, 821 S.E.2d 729, 729, 751 (N.C. 2018).
326. Id. at 743.
327. See id. at 742.
328. See generally Fried et al., The Effect of Minority Veto Rights, supra note 159
(studying the effectiveness of veto rights for minority shareholders regarding “relatedparty transactions”).
329. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 364 (acknowledging the massive benefit of majority-of-minority approval but
also flagging the material costs that it carries).
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an equity issuance on the trading price of the issuer and corroborates the
proposal. While shareholder approval was found to have an overall positive
effect on the market price of the shares, there were specific cases of negative
perception by the market.330 Accordingly, a possible explanation lies in the
alleged incentive of the blockholder-manager to perpetuate self-interests
through the equity issuance, without acting in the best interests of the
corporation.331 Indeed, the approval of the majority of the outsiders seems
to fix the possible flaw of a plain shareholder vote in controlled firms.
Finally, the rule outperforms preemptive rights — which European legal
tradition perceives as the landmark minority’s antidilution tool — for several
reasons. In OTK v. Friedman, the outsider shareholders would have had the
power to block the transaction¸ rather than being offered the right to purchase
pro-rata new shares at a twenty-six percent premium over their market
price.332 Not only do outsiders not need to increase their economic
investment in the firm under the proposal, but also the proposal arguably
addresses the information asymmetry issue.333 While preemptive rights are
effective only after the relevant constituency (either the shareholders or the
managers) have approved the transaction, the vote on the transaction can
block it.334 Therefore, the rule shifts the burden (and, indirectly, the cost of
the information asymmetry) onto the controller since each time that a
minority shareholder feels that she lacks complete information to approve,
she may simply vote against the transaction and in favor of the status quo.
Since the proposal allocates the cost to the side that has complete
information, it creates an incentive to disclose all the material information in
order to achieve approval of the transaction.
By contrast, authoritative scholars have addressed the topic of protecting
minority shareholders and pointed out how, differently from the case of the
controller’s dilution, the best fit for the protection of the minority
shareholders is the liability rule.335 Namely, a number of objections may be
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Holderness, supra note 107, at 434.
Id.
85 A.3d 696, 707 (Del. Ch. 2014); see supra text accompanying notes 182–88.
See supra text accompanying notes 262–67.
Note that the expression “can block it” means that the shareholders can vote to
block the transaction as it is structured at the time it is subject to the shareholders’
approval. In fact, the failure to obtain approval does not prevent the company from
completing the equity issuance. The structure of the transaction can subsequently be
amended in order to obtain the approval of the majority of disinterested shareholders or
to limit the participation of the controller up to her ratable new shares.
335. Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 21,
at 610 (“[T]he tradeoff between minority protection and controller rights supports a
liability-rule protection for minority shareholders to better balance minority protection
against agency costs and preservation of idiosyncratic vision.”).
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raised against the mandatory MoM: the remainder of this Section exposes
and tries to respond to several possible critiques to the proposal.
1. Costs
To begin with, corporate legal scholarship does not undermine the costs
that seeking the consent of the MoM requires.336 Making the approval a
requirement to engage in the transaction rather than a condition for being
granted the shield of the business judgment rule further strengthens the
reasoning. Within the category of the proposal’s costs, it has been
authoritatively pointed out that the veto power of minority shareholders
excessively limits the controllers and might prevent the firm from raising
additional capital when useful or from completing efficient transactions.337
This unfortunate effect may result either from a strategic decision of the
minority shareholders — which may adopt an aggressive approach aimed at
enhancing their benefit from the transaction — or from their mistake.338 To
this extent, a recent study — reporting on the case of a corporation whose
shares’ market price dropped after having missed the opportunity to grow —
argued that the voluntary MoM (which reasonably should be identified as a
liability rule protection)339 should prevail over the mandatory MoM since it
avoids the risk of hold-outs.340 Finally, the adoption of such property rule
possibly prevents the controller from completing any firm’s recapitalization
that she deems necessary to pursue her “idiosyncratic vision.”341
However, the specific framework of the proposal and the unique features
of the transaction hopefully address these concerns. Namely, the proposal
does not seek to grant minority shareholders a general veto power on the new

336. See Fried & Spamann, Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights, supra
note 95, at 364 (highlighting the benefit of MoM approval).
337. See FERRAN & HO, supra note 32, at 110.
338. See Goshen & Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, supra note
21, at 458.
339. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 978
(explaining how the controller’s option to have the transaction approved without the
minority’s approval may affect the negotiation since “the controller and the minority
shareholders[] negotiate ‘in the shadow’ of Delaware’s fair-price requirement”).
340. See Edward B. Rock, Majority of Minority Approval in a World of Active
Shareholders, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS 105, 123
(Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Tröger eds., 2019) [hereinafter Rock, Majority of Minority
Approval] (building on the example of the Cablevision case).
341. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 965
(stating that the concerns raised by giving minority shareholders a veto on the
reallocation of control rights “suggest that while empowering minority shareholders will
protect them from the risk of agency costs, it will also increase the risk of frustrating the
controller’s pursuit of idiosyncratic vision”).
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share issuances since the controller’s vote is frozen only if she subscribes
more than pro-rata. The difference is material since the failure to achieve
the MoM — as well as the non-willingness to seek it — does not prevent the
firm from engaging in any new shares issuances but rather implies that the
transaction be structured in a different way to avoid the requirement.342 In
other words, the proposed rule does not undermine the controller’s control
over the capital structure of the firm343 since should she deem it critical to
quickly issue additional shares for any reason, she refrains from increasing
her proportional stake in the firm and is not prevented from voting.344 From
this perspective, the new share issuances materially differ from the other
conflicted transactions that have witnessed the application of the MoM in
that its structure can easily be amended in order to lose the feature of being
a self-dealing transaction. Deepening the hold-out concern, there are two
different kinds of allegedly value-enhancing transactions that the public firm
could miss because of the failure to achieve the outsider’s consent. The first
category — which belongs to the corporate finance side of the transaction —
encompasses all the cases where raising additional equity capital is beneficial
for the firm for any business reason, possibly connected to the potential for
growth. However, in this scenario, the controller has the option to avoid any
corporate governance effects, limiting her purchase to her ratable shares.
Her voting rights would prevent the firm from losing interesting growth
opportunities. In Reith v. Lichtenstein, the issuer was raising capital to fund
an acquisition.345 Under the proposal, the controller could either subscribe
her ratable part or seek that the MoM increase her stake: each path could be
an effective way to complete a valuable acquisition.
The second category is more problematic since the controller is mainly
interested in the corporate governance side of the transaction. Namely, if
she specifically deems the reallocation of voting rights necessary to pursue
her vision and the issuance of new shares as only a tool to complete this
reorganization rather than as a way to raise funds,346 she would actually be
prevented from successfully accomplishing her goal absent consent from the
minority shareholders. While this undoubtedly exposes the controlling
shareholders and the firm to the holdout risk, this scenario arguably requires
342. Note that the fact that the controller does not purchase more than pro rata does
not mean that the preemptive right should be granted. In fact, the remaining part of the
offer should be structured also as a private placement to an outsider or as a public offer.
343. Id. at 462 (arguing that control over the capital structure of the firm should belong
to the controller).
344. See infra Section V.B.ii.b.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
346. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 963–
64.
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the involvement of the shareholders’ meeting and the consent of the minority
shareholders, who have invested funds in the firm and should not be forced
to accept a fundamental governance change without any consideration. In
fact, this feature flags a material difference between the new share issuances
and freeze-out transactions — the traditional field of the debate between the
entire fairness standard and shareholders’ consent. Namely, minority
shareholders are diluted but are not part of the transaction, which is entered
into by the firm and the new purchaser of shares (i.e., the controller in the
case at hand): they witness a dilution of their stake but do not receive any
proceeds. This non-trivial difference calls for a stronger approach
(mandatory MoM) for the dilutive equity issuances, compared to the freezeouts (voluntary MoM) when the controller takes the company private by
paying a premium of the share market price. The bottom line is that the
proposal does not subtract any managerial decision from the controller’s
autonomy; oppositely, it distinguishes between the business decision (the
above-mentioned “first category”) and the extraordinary corporate
governance decisions (the above-mentioned “second category”), which
reallocate voting or control rights and require the shareholders’ consent.
2. Lack of Flexibility
One of the intrinsic costs of the mandatory property rules — including the
proposed one — is the material decrease in the issuer’s flexibility.
Professors Goshen and Hamdani, endorsing a contractarian approach, have
recently advocated the adoption of a firm-by-firm approach that enhances
the autonomy of the corporations’ charters with regard to the allocation of
power to redistribute control rights.347 Accordingly, the institutional
shareholders may effectively exercise a strong influence over the provisions
of the corporate charter and, on the other hand, the protection of the
controller’s idiosyncratic vision should not be undermined.348 However, in
the context of new share issuances, the reliance on the charter of
incorporation presents some of the flaws that this Article pointed out about
the limit of the authorized shares.349 Namely, as much as the latter proves to
be ineffective since firms usually go public with a significant number of
unissued authorized shares, controller-managers would likely be able to
347. Id. at 986–89; see also Klausner, supra note 113, at 1327–28 (exposing a review
of the contractarian approach and explaining that according to its supporters, “contractual
governance is seen as superior to legally imposed governance arrangements because
firms are different along numerous dimensions and market forces create incentives to
customize and to innovate”).
348. Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 990–92.
349. See supra Section IV.A.
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enjoy the same broad power in structuring the firm’s pre-IPO charter of
incorporation.350 On the point, an authoritative opinion undermines the trust
in IPO charters, finding that they are usually empty documents with regard
to corporate governance provisions and mainly adopt default rules.351 The
Institutional Shareholder Service (“ISS”) recently disclosed an update on its
policy for voting on charter amendments and pointed out that pre-IPO boards
usually try to include provisions aimed at increasing their insulation from
post-IPO investors.352 Reasonably, the argument that in the context of the
IPO, public investors are more concerned with the share price than
governance provisions in the firm-charter,353 helps explain the empirical
evidence and flaws in the allocation of powers at the IPO stage (including
the high number of authorized non-issued shares). In addition, it seems
reasonable to predict that during the corporation’s life, any controller’s
amendment reallocating voting rights may occur only as an increase:354 the
case of a controller self-decreasing her power with regard to this critical
governance issue appears very unlikely.355 The complex process and the
distortions underlining the charter amendments in midstream companies, as
well as the power of the controller both before and after the IPO with regard
to the issue, calls for a mandatory rule.356
Adopting the charter-oriented approach, the power of the controller would
not result from her ability to deal with and reward public shareholders, but
mainly from her bargaining power at the time of the IPO. It must be pointed
out that an investor, which may or may not exercise a certain level of pressure
at the time of the IPO, might find it difficult to predict the development of
350. Cf. Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control, Dual Class, supra note 21, at 989–
90 (arguing that minority institutional investors usually have decent power to suggest a
pre-IPO amendment to the charter).
351. Klausner, supra note 113, at 1329–39; Lin, supra note 55, at 483–84 (exposing
an updated literature review pointing out the flaws in the contractarian theory).
352. ISS Releases 2016 Benchmark Policy Updates, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER
SERVS., https://www.issgovernance.com/iss-releases-2016-benchmark-policy-updates2/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2021) (“While some pre-IPO boards argue that these governance
structures will benefit investors over the long run, few of them provide opportunities for
post-IPO shareholders to ratify these provisions post-IPO.”).
353. Lin, supra note 55, at 485.
354. See id. at 486 (discussing amendments in the context of takeover defenses and
entrenchment provisions).
355. See Klausner, supra note 113, at 1348 (noting that empirical evidence shows that
managers seldom initiate governance changes unless shareholders exert pressure on
them). Notably, should a controller-manager be empowered to reallocate voting rights,
the degree of pressure would be extremely weak.
356. See Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 75, at 867
(“Mandatory legal rules and reversible defaults are indeed desirable, taking as given the
existing distortions in the charter amendment process.”).
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the firm and the degree of power that the founder should be entrusted with
to reallocate voting rights. Therefore, an investor would be asked to enter
into a blind decision and empower the founder with a blank check. Notably,
the decision and the alleged pressure of the initial outsider shareholders bind
not only themselves but also any other investors who might eventually
purchase the firm’s public shares. While this Article agrees with the intuition
of an increased reliance on institutional shareholders’ powers, it favors the
use of such powers with regard to the specific transaction and not broadly to
the charter of incorporation. Enhancing the shareholder powers with regard
to voting rights — considering their increased sophistication and incentives
— would help distinguish opportunistic value-destroying recapitalizations
from value-enhancing ones, since only the latter are expected to receive the
approval.357 Finally, if the controller really seeks to increase her power to
pursue her idiosyncratic vision — and she is not able to convince her public
investors — she may always take the firm private and enjoy more autonomy.
Although this transaction might require an increase in funding, the controller
may resort to a private partner. Contrarily, if she is not able to convince
either private or public investors of her plan, reasonably the “market check”
of her vision did not work.
3. Effectiveness
A separate but connected critique has been made about the real
effectiveness of the rule: arguably, in the context of a freeze-out transaction
or a management buyout (“MBO”), the minority shareholders might be
tempted by the idea of divesting and are unlikely to block the transaction
absent a higher offer than the proposed one.358 However, the fact that the
shareholders are not part of the transaction and do not receive any monetary
benefit during a new share issuance undermines this risk. Contrarily, the
shareholder vote might effectively provide the unique benefit of a market
check on the issuance price: in fact, once the proposed issuance price is
public, a third party may offer to purchase the firm’s shares at a higher price

357. See Lin, supra note 55, at 504 (“[E]mpowering shareholders would best mitigate
the risks of midstream opportunistic change by controllers with leveraged control and
would allow shareholders to adopt value-increasing midstream charter amendments.”).
358. See Rock, Majority of Minority Approval, supra note 340, at 121, 123; Kastiel,
supra note 189, at 100 (reporting that “[c]ritics of MFW often argue that giving
shareholders the additional protection of a majority-of-minority vote adds little value
because shareholders who suffer from information asymmetry will always vote for a
good premium deal offered by the controller” but also pointing out that in a M&A deal,
an informed activist shareholder — if present — would be able to use the MoM to obtain
a higher premium, therefore benefitting all shareholders).
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(or to enter into any other transaction).359 Namely, although the controller
may claim that she should be the purchaser in light of her “idiosyncratic
vision” and her business plan, she would still have a problematic task in
explaining why she should be preferred against a more economically
rewarding offer for the company. OTK Associates v. Friedman experienced
a similar situation:360 the structure of the issuance (rights offering) required
that the transaction be publicly pending for a longer period in order to let the
shareholders exercise their rights and, during this period, a third party offered
to purchase the share at a higher price. While the issuer ignored and did not
disclose the offer, under the proposed rule, shareholders would have to vote
on the alternative to accept.
4. Coerced Vote
The intrinsic flaw of any shareholder veto power — a broad family which
encompasses the MoM — concerns the possible coercion of the vote by the
decision maker who submits the resolution. However, the presence of a
controller amplifies the risk.361 Arguably, in the context of this transaction,
this issue is hardly avoidable from an ex-ante perspective, although it might
be limited. The proposed framework, requiring the full and uncoerced vote
of the MoM acknowledges that the approval of the MoM might not be
sufficient to guarantee the effectiveness and the value-maximization of the
process and the protection of minority shareholders. In fact, the insider
might condition the completion of an objectively value-enhancing
transaction on the approval of a new share issuance that the outsiders would
not have otherwise approved.362 However, the proposal does not set forth a
practical solution to the case of a coerced vote, nor a tool to exacerbate those
circumstances. While the overall goal of the proposal is to deal with the
359. See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 1, 53 (2005)
(explaining the market check upside with regard to the MoM in a freeze-out transaction).
Notably, the timeframe of the market check is reasonably shorter in new share issuances
in order to not paralyze the business of the firm.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 182–188.
361. See Lipton, supra note 156, at 1982–83 (noting that the presence of a controlling
shareholder alone may suffice to make the vote coerced without the need for the
controller to take further threatening action).
362. See Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., No. 11418-VCG, 2018 WL
3599997, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2018) (explaining that the value-enhancing acquisition
was contingent on the approval of a dilutive new share issuance); see also Rock, Majority
of Minority Approval, supra note 340, at 124 (pointing out the issues arising from a
coerced vote in the MoM approval); Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, supra note 75, at 864 (explaining the flaw of a shareholder veto right in public
corporations should managers bundle “a value-decreasing rule change favored by
management with a move that is value-increasing by itself”); Goshen, The Efficiency of
Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing, supra note 33, at 428.
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issue from an ex-ante perspective, it appears hard to avoid court intervention
in such case. The most effective solution seems to be to empower the
shareholders to seek a court’s injunction ahead of the shareholders’ meeting
(i.e., between the post of the proposed resolution and the expected day of the
vote). The other, weaker but likely more flexible, remedy consists of liability
protection after the vote and the completion of the transaction, against the
controller-manager for having failed to submit to the outsiders a proposed
resolution with an uncoerced vote. The first option — which completely
avoids the liability protection — is likely to be a more useful tool in both
addressing the problem and preventing it, since it allows the shareholders to
affect the outcome of the meeting rather than operating as an ex-post remedy.
However, the first option requires a prompt outcome of the court as to
whether the vote is coerced or not. Notably, although it is critical to address
the risk of a coerced vote — which would frustrate the purpose of the rule
— the case must be distinguished from the mere walk away, or threat to walk
away, from the overall deal by the controller.363
b. The Case of the Non-Purchasing Controller
The feature of this scenario is that the controlling shareholder does not
purchase the new shares more than pro-rata and the transaction dilutes (or
does not increase) her stake.364 Thus, she is positioned within the outsiders
of the group. The proposed rule is to let the controller vote and, therefore,
condition approval of the transaction on the consent of the holders of the
majority of the voting shares. Although the application of the shareholder
vote facially resembles the case of the non-controlled firm,365 the underlying
policy debate is significantly different.
The Delaware court witnessed this scenario in the recent CBS v. NAI
dispute and, in its order, acknowledged the “apparent tension in [Delaware]
law between a controlling stockholder’s right to protect its control position
and the right of the independent directors . . . to respond to a threat posed by
a controller, including possible dilution of the controller.”366 Namely,
363. See Subramanian, supra note 359, at 15 (exposing a practical case when, in the
context of the negotiation of a freeze-out, the controller-alleged threat was “nothing more
than an invocation of Alcatel’s [i.e., the controller] otherwise legal walkaway
alternative”).
364. See supra Section III.B.ii (analyzing the shareholder-manager conflict in this
context). Note that, as mentioned, the case of the controller who does not purchase
newly-issued shares does not consider the hypothesis of the controller who voluntarily
refrains from purchasing new (and overpriced) shares.
365. See supra Section V.B.i.
366. CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *5
(Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).
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corporate law may lay on the managers’ side — empowering them to dilute
the controller threatening the corporation367 — or on the controller’s side,
protecting her rights with a property rule.368 According to a recent
scholarship commenting on the mentioned dispute, the position of the board
“had some merit.”369 The proposed rule significantly undermines (if not
completely nullifies) this power of the directors to fight against a controlling
shareholder allegedly abusing her status and destroying the firm’s (and
minority shareholders’) value, on the ground that, from a policy perspective,
there is a strong case to enhance the controllers’ rights.
Professors Goshen and Hamdani recently argued that in the context of a
concentrated ownership structure, the managers should not be empowered to
expropriate controllers’ power and, therefore, called for a propriety-rule
defending the controlling position, applicable also in the context of “a
broader — and less intuitive — range of corporate actions, where corporatelaw doctrine is less clear” and may result in the dilution of the controller’s
position.370 Arguably, the property-based protection should not be limited to
the controller of a firm with concentrated ownership — who invests a
significant amount of resources to achieve and retain her influence — but
extended to the firms adopting a dual-class structure. Not only does
Delaware law (as last interpreted in CBS v. NAI) value control in dual-class
firms, but policy considerations also call for this approach. Namely, a recent
study pointed out the value of the non-voting shares — an extreme case of
dual-class structures — in that they efficiently allocate the voting rights to
the shareholders that value them the most and help make the management
accountable to the informed and motivated shareholders.371 Clearly,
367. See id. at *6 (reviewing the case law affirming this argument); see also supra
text accompanying note 199.
368. See id. (quoting passages of the cases that explicitly drew the power of the
controller to respectively “avoid its disenfranchisement as a majority shareholder” and
“prevent the issuance [which would have destroyed his voting control] by unseating
directors”); see also Adlerstein v. Wertheimer, No. CIV. A. 19101, 2002 WL 205684, at
*9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2002) (stating that the shareholder Adlerstein was empowered to
prevent its dilution through the new share issuances by “executing a written consent
removing” either of the two directors approving the issuance from the board); Frantz
Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401, 407 (Del. 1985).
369. See Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 46) (noting, on the other hand, that “it is
not clear that it would apply to every controlling shareholder where dual-class stock is
involved” and arguing that, given the preponderant governance purpose of the
transaction, the business judgement rule should not apply).
370. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 601–02 (“Controllers can lose control not only when they sell their shares, but also
when the company takes action — like issuing new shares — that dilutes the controllers’
holdings.”).
371. See Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 59, at 696–98.
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undermining the position of the shareholders with voting shares — as is the
case for controllers — frustrates this rationale. This Article does not intend
to argue in favor of the dual-class share structures for public companies;
however, should they be considered a problem, but the way to deal with it is
not to empower managers to dilute the controller through strategic issuances.
A possible critique of the rule is that since large shareholders are deemed
critical to avoid the dilution, they may oppose the issuance of new stocks in
order to retain their influence should they be not willing to invest additional
resources: this may lead to an underinvestment in the firm, preventing it
from reaching its optimal capital structure.372 The magnitude of this
argument may be particularly strong in the case of firms with concentrated
ownership structures. Namely, since this type of firm “bundles cashflow
rights and control rights,”373 the controller must subscribe the new shares in
order to retain control of the firm, contrary to what happens in the firms
adopting a dual-class structure. Notably, this rule does not necessarily result
in a veto right of the controller, since a controlling minority shareholder (or
de facto controller) may be deemed to have a controlling influence and still
not prevail in the vote, having the transaction approved against her will and
her fractional voting power and interest decreased. However, it must be
acknowledged that in the majority of cases, the approval of the controller
would be critical; therefore, she may successfully oppose an issuance that is
in the best interests of the firm.374 However, it must be noted how the same
underinvestment issue may be even worse with the current allocation of
powers. In fact, since large controllers are concerned with the dilution, they
also need to feel fairly protected from it: a seminal comparative corporate
law study claimed that freeze-out transactions should be endorsed, among
other things, because controllers may have weaker incentives to “invest
additional capital in positive net present-value projects if they are forced to
372. See Poulsen, supra note 97, at 152 (“It is hypothesized that firms in which the
largest shareholder would lose more influence in an equity increase have smaller equity
increases and lower investments.”); see also Kahan & Rock, Index Funds and Corporate
Governance, supra note 84, at 50 (expressly mentioning the case of the issuance of new
voting shares).
373. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 592 (suggesting that this bundling feature makes the concentrated ownership
structure the middle-ground alternative to respectively dual-class and dispersed
ownership structures, which may solve the agency issues of the two extreme structures).
374. But see Goshen & Hamdani, Majority Control and Minority Protection, supra
note 21, at 454–55 (explicitly addressing a similar case and arguing that, in order to
preserve the controller’s ability to pursue “idiosyncratic vision” and her right to make
managerial decisions — absent controller’s consent — a dilution should not occur even
if it is in the best interests of the corporation, regardless of whether the compensation is
fair).
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share their returns with minorities.”375 The argument should be transposed,
and is even stronger, to the opposition to new equity issuances since the
controlling shareholder, rather than being only prevented from increasing her
participation in the company (as it would happen were the freeze-out not
allowed), would face the risk of a significant decline in her fractional stake
in the firm at managers’ will.
On a practical note, the outcome of CBS v. NAI would not be significantly
different under the proposed framework since the order against the
shareholder was denied.376 However, some differences appear. First, the
controller achieved her goal, but the scope of her efforts was not tailored to
the issuance: the move was an amendment to the corporation’s charter,
strengthening the approval requirements applicable to any dilutive issuance
and, as such, it was effective but not narrowed.377 Second, while the case
eventually settled,378 the new rule clarifies the allocation of powers between
shareholders and managers in favor of the former. Third, the shareholders’
vote is consistent with the above-mentioned deference of Delaware courts to
the assessment of the financial markets and its increasingly sophisticated
players.379 To this extent, the same reputational and market-oriented
arguments that made some minority shareholders’ campaigns in controlled
companies effective380 may also deter the controller from abusing her
powerful voting rights, therefore limiting the risk that she vetoes appropriate
issuances.
The majority of this Section dealt with the hypothesis of equity issuances
diluting the controller. However, as mentioned, the same process applies to
the case of the controller participating pro-rata to the transaction, which is
subject to the plain shareholders’ vote that the controlling shareholder’s
voting power massively influences. Arguably, the controller-manager
should be entrusted with the business decisions381 and this issuance —
375. Rock et al., Fundamental Changes, supra note 37, at 174.
376. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 0341-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385,

at *1 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).
377. See id. at *2 (“NAI had executed and delivered consents to amend CBS’s bylaws
to, among other things, require approval by 90% of the directors then in office at two
separate meetings held at least twenty business days apart in order to declare a
dividend . . . .”).
378. See supra Part I.
379. Goshen & Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, supra note 79, at 289.
380. See Lund, Nonvoting Shares, supra note 59, at 742 (reporting cases in which the
public pressures of minority investors resulted in the controller adopting a governance
change, including the abolition of dual-class structures).
381. For a perspective where the controlling shareholder is pursuing its idiosyncratic
vision, see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and the Regulation of
Controlling Shareholders, in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS
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reasonably lacking any target with regard to the governance of the issuer —
genuinely falls in this category.382 Also, as explained in the previous Section,
this case represents the proper solution for a controller hoping that the firm
raises additional capital to take advantage of a business opportunity. Here
the cornerstone of the overall rule lies: all shareholders are entitled to
exercise their voting right regardless of their status (either controller or
minority), and there is enhanced protection for the minority shareholders
when the controller favors a corporate governance change. However, should
the transaction be only a business decision, the impact of the minority’s votes
in a controlled firm is likely to prove to be trivial.383
VI. CONCLUSION
The claim of this Article is to empower shareholders of public
corporations with a voting right in new share issuances. The proposal lies in
the massive impact that the issuance of new shares may have on the corporate
governance of the public firm. The proposal enhances the shareholders’
powers, seeks to limit these corporate governance impacts, and restates the
notion of new share issuance mainly as a corporate finance transaction.
Namely, the reduction of the managers’ flexibility in affecting the ownership
structure of the firm also prevents several abuses of the equity issuances
when they are not necessary from a business perspective. In fact, in addition
to the explained benefits of addressing the shareholder-manager and the
majority-minority conflicts, the proposed framework also reduces the
distortions that may occur in connection with a decision to issue new shares.
In fact, on one side, it limits new share issuances only to the cases where the
firm genuinely needs to raise additional capital or, alternatively, a reasonable
weighted majority of the shareholders agree with the decision to affect the
23, 30–31 (Luca Enriques & Tobias H. Troger eds., 2019), which explains how
asymmetric information and differences of opinion might lead to a different outcome if
the controller is entrusted with the decision or only outsider investors are. Note that —
with reference to supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text — in this scenario, the
controller reasonably falls among the managers of the firm, who are reasonably entrusted
with the business decisions.
382. See Goshen & Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note
21, at 607 (applying a similar reasoning to distributions and noting that “[a]ny rule that
would try to scrutinize pro rata dividend distributions would necessarily interfere with
the controller’s management rights and her ability to secure her idiosyncratic vision”);
see also Min, supra note 21 (manuscript at 45) (strongly arguing for a different treatment
between pro-rata and non-pra-rata transactions, although in the context of the dividends
issuance).
383. Lipton, supra note 156, at 1988 (noting that in the case of a controller with a
small stake, the benefit of MoM is trivial and following this line of reasoning, a minority
controller may be defeated regardless of her position).

78

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10:1

ownership structure. On the other side, it eliminates the incentives of the
managers to use alternative tools should the equity issuance be needed, given
that their purpose to keep authorized, but not issued shares, available for
strategic issuances would be frustrated by a shareholder vote on any equity
issuance.

